Just completed 14 years of service to the Commonwealth of Virginia as a board member of the Virginia Economic Development Partnership and then as a member of the Virginia Advisory Committee on International Trade (VEDP). Below is an announcement of my first appointment in 2009 by Governor Kaine. Was sworn in by my former George Mason University law student, Judge Joanathan Thatcher of the Fairfax Circuit Court. Of course, with me are my two kids (now lawyers with the U.S. Justice Dept. and the U.S. Dept. of Education) and my wife.

Author Profile – Dr. Stuart S. Malawer Stuart Malawer holds a Ph.D. from the Dept. of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. He has a J.D. from the Cornell Law School and a Diploma from The Hague Academy of International Law (Research Centre). He also studied at the Harvard Law School and St. Peter’s College at Oxford University. Professor Malawer was a member of the Virginia Governor’s trade missions to China, India, and Japan. Dr. Malawer was awarded the Hardy Cross Dillard Award by the Virginia State Bar, in recognition of serving as Chairman of its International Practice Section and Special Editor of the Virginia Lawyer. Most recently, he published articles on the US-China trade litigation, Trump’s trade policies, and cybersecurity. Recent books have included Trump and Trade – Policy and Law (2021), Global Trade and International Law (2012), US National Security Law (2009), and WTO Law, Litigation and Policy (2007). Professor Malawer served as the Director and Founder of the Graduate International Transactions Program at George Mason University (a masters’ program in international affairs). He was subsequently named the Distinguished Service Professor of Law & International Trade, as well as the Director of the Oxford Trade Program. This program was held annually in partnership with St. Peter’s College at Oxford and Geneva. The GMU Alumni Association named Professor Malawer the Distinguished Faculty Member of the Year. He was a gubernatorial appointee to the Virginia Economic Development Partnership and recently to the Virginia International Trade Committee. He may be contacted at: StuartMalawer@msn.com

 Stuart Malawer in China by Great Wall of China (During Virginia Governor’s Trade Mission)

Just a note concerning my public service to the Commonwealth of Virginia. Just completed several years of service on the Virginia Advisory Committee on International Trade and the Virginia Economic Development Partnership. This involved a number of gubernatorial appointments by various Virginia governors (Kaine, McAuliffe and Northam). Also was a delegate on a number of Virginia governor’s trade missions to Japan, India and China. Always active in promoting interational trade and investment as important to state economic development. Was a great honor to do so. Look forward to more service to Virginia.

                                              With Governor Mark Warner in China.

                                          2023 Biography for Dr. Stuart S. Malawer (Click Here)

                2001 (with the Director-General Mike Moore and Peter Watson)                                                  

                                                                            At the WTO 1999

From my LinkedIn posts (June 2023) …………….

1 more day and it will be official ….. Retirement from GMU on June 1st after 46 years of teaching at the law school and public policy (and a total of 55 years at other schools). Thanks to many of you for your help with my classes over the years and for the friendship of many others. I am looking forward to continuing our friendship ……  Stuart

 I want to thank everyone who responded to my post retiring from George Mason University after a total of 55 years of teaching at GMU and elsewhere. Never, ever thought about retirement. Always focused on preparing for the next class and writing the next article. I’m simply amazed about how diverse my students have been and what they are doing now. But what I want to say — It is I who have benefited gigantically, grew and greatly expanded my understanding of the world through your eyes. Thank you !

                                                                            2018

St. Peter’s College, Oxford (Oxford Trade Program) (1998)

Great article in today’s Washington Post about the new toxic global trade environment concerning political risks — involving national security, balance of power, domestic policies. Here are a few quotes.

• Investors and companies are facing the most complex global landscape in decades, as political conditions once regarded as enduring give way to profound and unpredictable change.

• To varying degrees, governments in the United States, Europe and China are all now emphasizing a greater economic role for the state. That means encouraging — and discouraging — specific commercial activities.

• We’re in a very difficult environment for multinational corporations, and look, I think we’re in a very difficult environment for companies that are based outside the United States to invest in the United States. The United States is also thinking of putting more restrictions on.

• The speed and scope of change is exceptional. Events that one could imagine that  they will never happen, they are happening one after the other.

 “Global Investors and Mounting Political Risks.” Washington Post (April 7, 2023).

Two really interesting pieces appeared today on the dramatic change in attitude toward global trade in the US, by both political parties. One in the Washington Post and the other in the Financial Times. Here are the salient excerpts.

“[Disenchantment over trade with China has fed wider disenchantment with global commerce itself; consequently, neither party actively supports new trade promotion agreements anymore.”

“The Most Underrated Political Story.” Washington Post (March 23, 2023).

“These interventions (new US economic legislation), targeting foreign and domestic companies, are nothing short of revolutionary in a US context. For decades, Democrats and Republicans have trusted market forces …. But the proposed measures, devised through the prism of national security policy must …  [have] rigorous safeguards.” 

“National Security is Shaping US Regulation.” Financial Times (March 23, 2023).

New article just published. New US legislation is more aggressive and raises a number of issues — involving national security, foreign policy and both domestic and international economics.

Malawer, “The US Trade Relations with China: Worrisome Developments in the US Law.’ 9 China and WTO Review 147 (March 2023).  (Archives V9N1 (07) (yiil.org))

Stuart Malawer Biographical Statement.

      Both the Trump administration and now the Biden administration have attacked the WTO’s dispute resolution system, unjustifiably.

    This attack has grown even more intense in the last two months when two panels ruled in favor of China and against the U.S. In both cases the panels rejected the U.S. defense of national security under Gatt Article XXI. (In cases involving Section 232 tariffs on steel and origin markings.) Another WTO panel ruled a bit earlier against the United States concerning its Section 301 imposition of tariffs alleging improper Chinese IPR practices.

     All these cases have now been appealed to the defunct Appellate Body process — which the United States caused by blocking appointments to that body.

     This has led to the situation where China is now both championing the rule of law in trade relations and the disputed resolution system of the WTO. A system in which the U.S. was the architect.

      A good piece that appeared this week discusses this unfortunate foreign policy of the United States. Here are some excerpts.

• Such was Donald Trump’s distaste for the WTO that he threatened to pull the United States out of the organization altogether. It’s debatable whether this could be done without the approval of Congress, but the subtleties of Constitutional interpretation were never Trump’s forte. In the meanwhile, his associates dismantled the WTO’s dispute settlement system and challenged many of the basic precepts of the organization including special treatment for developing countries and the use of national security exemptions to aggressively stymie exports from other countries. 

• President Biden has put far greater emphasis on alliances, the environment, and on human rights. He has shown respect for his allies, and he seems to listen to what they say. One area where little has changed however is trade and this is particularly true with respect to the WTO. Gone are the bombastic rhetoric and pugilistic protectionist actions. In its place is a kind of sneering indifference, a view that supporting, let alone leading the WTO. 

• The US “effort” at reforming the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO is equally opaque. The Trump administration had deliberately crippled the dispute system by blocking the appointment of the seven jurists who serve on the Appellate Body. While the wider membership was dismayed at the US tactics, Trump administration officials quite skillfully laid out the case against the Appellate Body, convincingly arguing that the AB had been overreaching its mandate and taking up issues not under appeal. What US officials Lighthizer and Shea never explained was how this should be fixed. 

• The December dispute settlement panel decisions on against the US on its steel and aluminum tariffs will complicate reform efforts. The four cases, in which Lighthizer used a Kennedy administration statute to justify the tariffs on national security grounds, applied against exports from China, Norway, Switzerland, and Norway …. The USTR press release condemning the ruling proved him right. Still, the Biden administration cannot be singled out on this point. Previous administrations had expressed similar indignation at the possibility that WTO lawyers might weigh in on what constitutes the national security interest of a superpower. 

• Another country that has taken note is China. Filling the void left by the United States has been a hallmark of Beijing’s foreign and economic policy for some time.

                                       “Disintegration of the WTO.” (2023)

This is a good piece in the Wall Street Journal today discussing the U.S. and the WTO’s dispute resolution system. Too bad it describes the Trump-Biden scorn of it. Here are a few statements from this article.

… The globalization boom that began in the 1990s didn’t happen by itself: It was lubricated by the biggest economies’ willingness to write, enforce and obey shared rules of engagement.

… That consensus is now crumbling. The World Trade Organization, the embodiment of this rules-based order, has increasingly been sidelined as countries turn to export controls, subsidies and tariffs to promote domestic industries or kneecap adversaries.

… Many blame this on the U.S., as first President Trump and now President Biden rejected WTO authority and enacted tariffs and subsidies that riled trading partners.

… Biden has governed as a champion of the international order, yet on trade, he has stuck with many of the policies enacted by the avowedly nationalistic Mr. Trump. He has maintained Mr. Trump’s tariffs on China and blocked appointments to the WTO appellate body, which has the final say on enforcement decisions, leaving it unable to function.

… Last month, in two separate decisions, WTO panels ruled that the Trump administration had violated its WTO obligations by imposing tariffs on imported steel and aluminum, and requiring that products made in Hong Kong be labeled as made in China.

… A spokesman for U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai criticized the decision. The WTO, he said, had no right to even rule on the U.S. actions. The U.S., he noted, has for more than 70 years insisted that it, not the WTO, gets to decide what qualifies as national security.

… The U.S. had originally pushed for the WTO’s binding dispute mechanism out of frustration that under its predecessor, GATT, enforcement decisions could be easily blocked by any one country.

… The unintended consequence is that countries unhappy with U.S. trade laws, rather than negotiate, sue the U.S. at the WTO, and often win because WTO judges take an expansive view of their own authority to interpret and, critics say, make trade law.

… This doesn’t portend a return to the 1930s, when countries dramatically raised tariffs and retreated into autarky. The WTO still exists, and most members still abide by their commitments. Some have used alternative channels to adjudicate disputes while the appellate body remains defunct.

… U.S. officials say their imposition of trade barriers on national-security grounds won’t precipitate a flood of frivolous copycat actions. Any country making such a claim accepts the right of affected trading partners to retaliate—and would thus think twice. “There’s a self-regulating nature to invoking national security,” one official says, noting that the U.S. faced retaliation for its steel and aluminum tariffs long before the WTO ruled.

… Rather than a single set of rules imposed on fundamentally incompatible systems, such as China’s and the U.S.’s, the world will migrate toward a series of regional pacts.

“The WTO and Policing the Trading System.” Wall Street Journal (January 14, 2023).