BIDEN – TRUMP TARIFF WARS — MORE COMING?

Posted on May 11, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

The Trump-Biden 2.0 presidential race this year is leading down the road to competitive protectionism. Here’s various quote from recent article discussing this unfortunate, and all too obvious, development.

…. “Donald Trump famously and proudly declared himself Tariff Man during his presidency …. President Joe Biden is now seizing the moniker …. Biden’s anticipated refocusing of Trump tariffs first rolled out in 2018 to target Chinese electric vehicles will mark yet another escalation in the US trade relationship with China …. The US is already an active combatant in the EV wars thanks to the billions of dollars in subsidies being rolled out thanks to Biden’s embrace n of industrial policy …. Those subsidies and similar ones for semiconductors will likely remain more consequential economically than even 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs given the US imports very few actual vehicles from China …. Like Trump’s promise of even more — appear mainly to be about politics and this year’s election …. Just how much these latest tariffs will alter the US economic competition with China or US automakers and consumers’ shift to EVs will take years to determine.” ”Biden and Tariff Man Trump.” Bloomberg (May 13, 2024).

…. “The Biden administration is discussing raising tariffs on some Chinese goods, including electric vehicles, in an attempt to bolster the U.S. clean-energy industry …. Biden administration officials, long divided over trade policy, have left in place Trump-era tariffs on roughly $300 billion of Chinese goods …. Chinese EVs are already subject to a 25% tariff, Raising that tariff, which comes on top of a 2.5% tariff on auto imports …. Trade with China is quickly emerging as a major issue in the 2024 presidential contest.” “Biden and Tariffs on EVs.” Wall Street Journal (May 11th, 2024).

….“The Biden-Trump trade war is simply accelerating the erosion of the open trading system created by the U.S. in the anti-Soviet era …. Trump would find little legal authority to impose a general and nondiscriminatory tariff; he and other presidents, in contrast, are absurdly supplied with legislative pretexts for favor-factory-style protectionism, the kind guaranteed to provoke tit-for-tat retaliation. This isn’t the 1930s but the risk goes up when nations are under internal stress ….Trump trade folly at least could hardly be as gratuitous as the folly Mr. Biden seems determined to commit. Mr. Biden shows every sign of wanting to start a global trade war.” “Whose Trade War is Worse — Biden’s or Trump’s?” Wall Street Journal (May 11, 2024).

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U.S. – China Trade Relations — Getting Worse?

Posted on May 2, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Trade relations between the U.S. and China continue to be strained and seemingly getting a bit worse. The threat and possibility of a new Trump administration, new legislation concerning a possible mandated forced sale of TikTox, new U.S. subsidies to the Chip industry, and litigation concerning the solar imports — all contribute to a nasty trade environment. Here are a few quotes from recent news accounts ………….

 

  • “TikTok filed its suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that selling its U.S. operations was not commercially, technologically, or legally feasible …. National security concerns about TikTok are speculative and fall short of what’s required to justify violating First Amendment rights …. Fears of a potential security threat from TikTok have escalated in the last year and a half, prompting bans of the app on federal devices and those issued by some city and state governments.” “TikTok Sues U.S. Government.” New York Times (May 8, 2024). 

  • “Donald Trump’s economic advisers are eyeing aggressive new legal justifications to impose tariffs on all imports …. But the Constitution gives power over both taxation and regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which complicates the extent to which the president can impose tariffs through executive action …. In addition to the 10 percent “universal” tariff, Trump has proposed pushing import duties on China as high as 60 percent …. One option, based on a 1977 law, gives the president power over international commerce if the chief executive determines the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, the economy or foreign policy ….  The other option is a 1930 law that allows presidents to impose duties on countries that “have discriminated against the commerce of the United States.” …. A third option is to cite a 1974 law that gives the executive branch authority to act in retaliation against foreign trade practices, which was the power Trump relied on for tariffs against China in his first term.” “Plans to Muscle Up for a Global Trade War.” Washington Post (May 8th, 2024).

  • America’s collective national body is suffering from a chronic case of China anxiety …. Congress has moved to force the sale of TikTok, the Chinese-owned social media application; some states have sought restrictions on Chinese individuals or entities owning U.S. land and on Chinese researchers working in American universities; and the federal government has barred certain Chinese technology firms from competing in our markets. These measures all have a national security rationale …. Chinese students are questioned and researchers traveling to and from China on the grounds that they may be agents of the Chinese state ….  If the United States is to properly compete with China, it’s going to require healthy, balanced policymaking that protects U.S. national security. “Take a Deep Breath About China.” New York Times (May 6, 2024).

  • “The economic cost to Beijing of Trump’s tariffs, retained by Biden, is real. Chinese companies slapped with tariffs exported less to the U.S. …. The damage to China’s gross domestic product from the trade war was three times as high as the hit to the U.S. …. Trump has said that if re-elected, he might impose tariffs of up to 60% on imports from China.”  “Rematch of Trump vs. China.” Wall Street Journal (May 2, 2024).

  • “Biden’s signing of the law started a 270-day clock, which could extend to a full year, during which the government has ordered TikTok to be sold to a non-Chinese buyer. If ByteDance does not divest by then, the administration said it would work to block TikTok from Apple’s and Google’s app stores …. But the law could be weakened by the fact that the United States does not ban foreign ownership of U.S. media companies. The Federal Communications Commission voted in 2013 to relax its long-standing rule concerning foreign investment in radio and TV …. Trump’s effort to ban the app in 2020 was overturned by federal judges who said the government had not shown sufficient proof of harm to justify violating Americans’ speech freedoms. Montana’s statewide TikTok ban was halted last year by a federal judge who said it carried a pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment and violated the Constitution in more ways than one.” “TixTox and Legal War.” Washington Post (April 28, 2024).

  • “With recent multi-billion-dollar grants to Intel, TSMC, Samsung, and Micron, the US government has now spent over half its $39bn in Chips Act incentives …. Production would be roughly enough for the needs of critical infrastructure like datacenters and telecoms …. Japan and Europe are investing in foundational chip capacity …. Critics worry all these incentives create a subsidy race — but this began well before the Chips Act. A 2019 OECD study found that between 2014 and 2018 at least two US companies received more money from a foreign government than from the US …. Equity investors will debate whether these new investments can deliver an adequate financial return. Policymakers who see the Chips Act as an insurance policy against geopolitical shocks believe it is already paying dividends.” “Success of CHIP Act.” Financial Times (April 26, 2024).

  • “The Biden administration has used the Inflation Reduction Act and other policies to try to revive the U.S. solar manufacturing industry. That has spurred more manufacturing of solar panels …. A group of solar manufacturers have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce to investigate potentially illegal trade practices by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam and impose higher tariffs on products they export to the United States. The complaint focuses on companies that have their headquarters in China …. In addition to the allegations in the petition, solar manufacturers have raised concerns about the use of forced labor in production of polysilicon in China and other Southeast Asian countries.”  “Solar Panels & U.S. Manufacturing.” New York Times (April 24, 2024).

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Local / State Land Restrictions & U.S. National Security — Is this Really a National Security Issue or Merely Politics? Will They Withstand Legal Challenges?

Posted on April 29, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Chinese investment in U.S. farmland has now become a political issue. The relationship between state and federal law concerning foreign ownership of farmland has now become a constitutional issue as well. Local land use requirements, especially foreign ownership, have been traditionally a matter of state and local law. Federal cases are already being filed contesting new state restrictions as violating separation-of- powers and blatant racism — and a misuse reliance on national security. A recent piece in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times highlight this emerging issue.

 

  • “More than three dozen states have enacted or are considering laws restricting land purchases by Chinese citizens and companies, arguing that such transactions are a growing threat to national security …. State lawmakers have been especially worried about Chinese investment in agricultural land and territory near military installations ….. Chinese interests own less than 1 percent of foreign-held agricultural land in the United States …. Civil rights groups have challenged these laws in federal court on grounds that they violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act, and that they undercut the federal government powers on foreign affairs …. These laws  recalled the alien land laws from the early 20th century, which effectively prohibited Asian immigrants from buying farmland and, in some cases, homes in many states.” “When Buying a Home Is Treated as a National Security Threat.” New York Times (May 7th, 2024).

  • “From Florida to Indiana and Montana, an expanding array of local proposals, bills, laws and regulations aim to block Chinese individuals and companies from acquiring land, winning contracts, working on research, setting up factories and otherwise participating in the U.S. economy …. Virginia Governor Youngkin says he opposed the Ford plant for electric-vehicle batteries because he didn’t want to allocate Virginia taxpayer money to support Chinese technology …. Gov. Youngkin said issues such as land use are state-level decisions, in Virginia’s case sometimes affecting national-security assets …. The land issue is particularly knotty. The federal government says Chinese entities are the registered owners of under 1% of the foreign-held agricultural land in the U.S., with 87% of that owned by five companies. …. Florida has legislated some of the most far-reaching China decoupling …. To detractors, the anti-China measures can be unnecessary, poorly conceived and ineffective political grandstanding, sometimes even racist or unconstitutional …. Several efforts have faced legal challenges. “States Take On China in the Name of National Security.” Wall Street Journal (April 29, 2024).

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Protectionism (U.S. and Global) — How Much Longer Will this be the Story of Today’s Global Trade? (Chips, Solar Panels, Steel, Investment Flows, TixTox — What Next?)

Posted on April 18, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Protectionism, subsidies and industrial policy are expanding both in the United States and other countries. This is a newer development in the landscape of global trade. The question now is will this continue or will countries begin to understand, once again, that in the end this is very poor policy. Recent protectionism has utilized national security and other non-economic rationales. Often relating to industrial policies, subsidies, tariffs, export controls, digital date flow, Internet apps and restricting foreign ownership (in land, specific sectors and companies) and restricting certain outward flows and investment. This is particularly pronounced in U.S.-China trade relations. And has become a leading issue in Trump v. Biden 2.0.  Protectionism often goes along with isolationism and nationalism. Here’s a various comments concerning this unfolding story of 2024, focusing on U.S. legal developments.

  • “Nippon Steel … has been asked to provide more information about the transaction with U.S. Steel to the Department of Justice (as to antitrust implications) …. It has also called attention to the ultimate arbiter of the merger: the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) …. It appears to be the 1980s all over again — when anxiety over trade with Japan ran high …. The committee could argue that there are national security concerns related to any loss of U.S. control over domestic steel supplies.” “U.S. Steel – Nippon Steel and CFIUS (National Security).”New York Times (May 4th, 2024).

  • “Data indicate that the impact of the China Shock on US manufacturing jobs is not significant post-2011 …. Politicians advocating for economic nationalist policies are basing their trade policy decisions on evidence that no longer holds …. Imports from the leading emerging economies, excluding China, have made a positive contribution to US manufacturing employment over the past decade …. US policymakers would do well to pivot their focus toward our comparative advantage in tradable services, rather than prioritizing efforts to bring back lost manufacturing jobs …. Reactionary protectionism can inflict even greater harm than foreign imports on American workers and businesses …. America’s challenge is to find effective ways to build a strong economy that captures the positive aspects of globalization. “How Imports Support American Jobs.” Hinrich (Georgetown Study) (April 2024).

  • “Biden’s signing of the law started a 270-day clock, which could extend to a full year, during which the government has ordered TikTok to be sold to a non-Chinese buyer. If ByteDance does not divest by then, the administration said it would work to block TikTok from Apple’s and Google’s app stores …. But the law could be weakened by the fact that the United States does not ban foreign ownership of U.S. media companies. The Federal Communications Commission voted in 2013 to relax its long-standing rule concerning foreign investment in radio and TV …. Trump’s effort to ban the app in 2020 was overturned by federal judges who said the government had not shown sufficient proof of harm to justify violating Americans’ speech freedoms. Montana’s statewide TikTok ban was halted last year by a federal judge who said it carried a pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment and violated the Constitution in more ways than one.” “TixTox and Legal War.” Washington Post (April 28, 2024).

  • “With recent multi-billion-dollar grants to Intel, TSMC, Samsung, and Micron, the US government has now spent over half its $39bn in Chips Act incentives …. Production would be roughly enough for the needs of critical infrastructure like datacenters and telecoms …. Japan and Europe are investing in foundational chip capacity …. Critics worry all these incentives create a subsidy race — but this began well before the Chips Act. A 2019 OECD study found that between 2014 and 2018 at least two US companies received more money from a foreign government than from the US …. Equity investors will debate whether these new investments can deliver an adequate financial return. Policymakers who see the Chips Act as an insurance policy against geopolitical shocks believe it is already paying dividends.” “Success of CHIP Act.” Financial Times (April 26, 2024).
  • “The Biden administration has used the Inflation Reduction Act and other policies to try to revive the U.S. solar manufacturing industry. That has spurred more manufacturing of solar panels …. A group of solar manufacturers have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce to investigate potentially illegal trade practices by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam and impose higher tariffs on products they export to the United States. The complaint focuses on companies that have their headquarters in China …. In addition to the allegations in the petition, solar manufacturers have raised concerns about the use of forced labor in production of polysilicon in China and other Southeast Asian countries.”  “Solar Panels & U.S. Manufacturing.” New York Times (April 24, 2024)
  • “A group of seven leading solar manufacturers filed trade complaints formally requesting that the Biden administration impose tariffs on solar products being exported from Southeast Asia into the United States …. The petitions were filed with the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission …. Chinese companies have been relocating production of solar products to neighboring countries to avoid existing tariffs …. The trade complaints are focused on imported solar cells, the parts of solar panels that turn light into electricity …. The call for new tariffs comes as the Biden administration has been increasingly vocal in its complaints about China’s excess industrial capacity.”  “Solar Companies File Petition for New Tariffs.” New York Times (April 25, 2024).
  • “In January, 50 members sent a letter to Tai, Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan, and Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Jonathan Kanter, expressing concern over US digital trade policy …. The 2024 edition of NTE, however, was quickly identified as missing at least two key types of information compared to past publications …. While previous NTE reports consistently included foreign digital trade rules, especially data localization mandates and ex ante competition regulations, the 2024 edition either removed these points entirely or significantly restructured the language that highlighted such barriers. Second, the NTE also reduced its opposition to import substitution policies …. After more than three years in office, patience with Tai has worn thin.” “USTR’s Agenda.” Hinrich (April 23, 2024)
  • “Under the House bill (passed April 20th, 2024) ByteDance would have up to 360 days to divest TikTok. If it declined or failed to do so during that time, mobile app stores would be prohibited from offering the app to users, effectively banning it nationwide. The bill explicitly targets TikTok and ByteDance, but would give the president the power to impose a similar ultimatum against other apps …. (But the House bill) is likely to face significant legal hurdles (in the Senate), as have previous attempts by the Trump administration and states to force a sale or ban of the app.” “House TikTok Ban.” Wahington Post (April 21, 2024).
  • “Poor trade policy decisions by the Biden administration, like the two-year solar tariff moratorium, have allowed China to severely undermine the law and continue to cement its dominance …. the solar industry …. The Biden administration’s clean energy tax credits and subsidies are estimated to be worth $600 billion to $1.2 trillion over a decade. However, industry officials have complained …. that some of the tax credit rules are too loose, allowing solar companies to claim credits even if they import components and assemble the panels in the U.S.” “Chinese Exports and U.S. Solar Industry.” New York Times (April 21, 2024).
  • “Mr. Biden is weighing new measures to protect nascent industries like electric-vehicle production and solar-panel manufacturing from Chinese competition …. Biden called for higher tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum products and announced a new trade investigation into China’s heavily subsidized shipbuilding industry.” “China and US Industry Makeover.” New York Time (April 19, 2024).
  • “Digital rights groups and others around the world have taken notice — and raised the question of how the moves against TikTok contradict the United States’ arguments in favor of an open internet …. Any U.S. TikTok ban or sale would require officials to explain why the measure was different from efforts in other countries to restrict the flow of digital data inside their borders …. The United States has pushed for data to be able to flow between countries unhindered.” “TikTox and Open Internet.” New York Times (April 19, 2024).
  • “Steel and aluminum tariffs are not good for the U.S. manufacturing sector or its workers. That’s because many fewer workers are employed by firms that make these metals than they are by firms that use these metals as a product input …. As president, Biden has extended (almost) all of Trump’s tariffs — or in the case of steel and aluminum, swapped out some of the tariffs for slightly different trade barriers (such as import quotas). Biden has extended those Trump tariffs even when doing so conflicts with other parts of his economic agenda, such as increasing competition …. The Biden administration is vigorously defending his predecessor’s tariffs in court.” “Biden’s Trade Policy and Trump’s.” Washington Post (April 19, 2024).
  • “After years of complaints about China’s subsidies of private and state-owned industries, the United States and Europe have increasingly copied Beijing’s playbook, undertaking multibillion-dollar industrial policies …. The United States passed two mammoth bills in 2022 to strengthen its domestic semiconductor industry (Chips Act) and renewable energy sector (Inflation Reduction Act) …. President Biden called for major increases in some tariffs on steel and aluminum products from China …. Positive appraisals of industrial policies have grown in recent years …. What stands out about this current resurgence is that there is a reliance on costly subsidies. These are often combined with other types of discriminatory measures against foreign firms.” “Countries Rever to Protectionism.” New York Times (April 17, 2024).
  • “Biden is proposing to triple the 7.5% tariff under Section 301 on certain Chinese steel and aluminum imports. He also teed up a trade investigation into Chinese shipbuilding in response to a petition by the union ….  Biden has scrapped nearly every Trump policy, he has maintained most of his predecessor’s tariffs despite their economic harm …. China’s mercantilism is a special trade problem, but Chinese steel makes up only 2% of U.S. imports and 0.6% of consumption, largely owing to Trump’s tariffs and antidumping duties. Trump has proposed a 10% tariff on all imports.  Biden on Wednesday reaffirmed his opposition to Nippon Steel’s purchase of U.S. Steel.  Tariffs and subsidies may prop up uncompetitive companies for a time, but they harm countless forgotten men.”  “Race to be Protectionist-in-Chief.” Wall Street Journal (Lead Editorial) (April 18, 2024). 
  • “President Biden called for raising tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from China, beginning what is expected to be a broadside of protectionist steps against Beijing …. Biden’s move comes as the administration is studying raising tariffs on a range of Chinese exports to the U.S., including electric vehicles, batteries and solar products …. China’s response to the backlash has been to decry rising protectionism, arguing their exports are the result of market dynamics …. The U.S. Trade Representative will also open an investigation into Chinese shipbuilding practices.” “New Biden Tariff on Chinese Steel.” Wall Street Journal (April 17, 2024).
  • “Under the committee’s (CFIUS) statutory analytical framework, Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel poses no national-security risk to the U.S. …. Nothing in this steel-making transaction risks compromising cutting-edge technology, critical infrastructure, sensitive data or the defense industrial base’s supply chain …. Nippon Steel’s investment in U.S. Steel promises to enhance American production capacity and strengthen geopolitical ties between the U.S. and Japan in the face of Chinese aggression. Japan is of indispensable strategic importance, not least because of its supporting U.S.-led export controls.”  “CFIUS and U.S. Steel Acquisition.” Wall Street Journal (April 16, 2024).
  • “The panel that reviews foreign investments (CFIUS) will get new powers to obtain information and levy higher fines under a proposal from the Treasury Department, a move that comes amid intense official scrutiny on U.S.-China investment flows. The proposal announced Thursday would allow Cfius, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., to more easily subpoena companies involved in corporate acquisitions and to expand the types of information it can require they turn over …. President Biden in 2022 ordered Cfius to scrutinize transactions that could give adversaries access to critical technologies or endanger supply chains and personal data.” “Treasury Proposal and CFIUS.” Wall Street Journal (April 12, 2024).

  • “In response to national security and geopolitical concerns, there has been a renewed focus on foreign investment in the US, including investment in real estate. At the federal level, in 2018, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was given expanded authority to review certain types of real estate transactions by foreign investors. Additionally, in recent years, the passage of state legislation restricting or prohibiting investment in US real property by foreign individuals, companies, and governments has surged …. While some states already had laws restricting foreign investment, primarily in agricultural land, a recent CFIUS decision has led to an increase in proposed state laws restricting foreign investment more broadly. In 2022, CFIUS determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review an acquisition of land by a Chinese-owned company …. This decision generated significant national security discourse across the US.” “State Law and Foreign Ownership of Land.” Reuters (April 1, 2024).

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Growing U.S. Legal Storm over U.S.-China Trade Relations?

Posted on April 10, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     The recent visit by the U.S. Treasury Secretary Yellin this month (April) to China was not very productive.  This blog provides quotes from recent articles commenting on U.S.-China trade relations focusing on the U.S. legal aspects.

     As I said previously, to me, recent developments and comments highlight the broad and disturbing new aspects of geopolitics and trade.  This is especially the situation as we enter a new presidential election in the United States and seemingly a newer era of geopolitics. These development raises newer issues of national security, national industrial policies, regional arrangements, among a host of other trade-related issues (deglobalization / reglobalization, supply chains, etc.).

    Legal and political issues today concern, among others, continued U.S. trade and investment restrictions (inward and outward investment controls), U.S. tariffs, U.S. export controls, manufacturing subsidies (chips, EV’s, batteries), cross-border-mergers, multinational corporate operations, the general decline of WTO support and a rules-based system by the U.S. — and a general administration hostility demonstrated by both the Trump and Biden administrations — as well as by Congress. And of course, fears concerning a Trump 2.0. 

  • “President Biden called for raising tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from China, beginning what is expected to be a broadside of protectionist steps against Beijing …. Biden’s move comes as the administration is studying raising tariffs on a range of Chinese exports to the U.S., including electric vehicles, batteries and solar products …. China’s response to the backlash has been to decry rising protectionism, arguing their exports are the result of market dynamics …. The U.S. Trade Representative will also open an investigation into Chinese shipbuilding practices.” “New Biden Tariff on Chinese Steel.” Wall Street Journal (April 17, 2024).

  • “Under the committee’s (CFIUS) statutory analytical framework, Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel poses no national-security risk to the U.S. …. Nothing in this steel-making transaction risks compromising cutting-edge technology, critical infrastructure, sensitive data or the defense industrial base’s supply chain …. Nippon Steel’s investment in U.S. Steel promises to enhance American production capacity and strengthen geopolitical ties between the U.S. and Japan in the face of Chinese aggression. Japan is of indispensable strategic importance, not least because of its supporting U.S.-led export controls.”  “CFIUS and U.S. Steel Acquisition.” Wall Street Journal (April 16, 2024).

  • “The panel that reviews foreign investments (CFIUS) will get new powers to obtain information and levy higher fines under a proposal from the Treasury Department, a move that comes amid intense official scrutiny on U.S.-China investment flows. The proposal announced Thursday would allow Cfius, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., to more easily subpoena companies involved in corporate acquisitions and to expand the types of information it can require they turn over …. President Biden in 2022 ordered Cfius to scrutinize transactions that could give adversaries access to critical technologies or endanger supply chains and personal data.” “Treasury Proposal and CFIUS.” Wall Street Journal (April 12, 2024).

  • “The changes in the NTE symbolize a larger shift in U.S. trade philosophy. The first example from this year’s NTE concerns foreign barriers to digital trade. In effect, USTR has withdrawn from its previous position on data localization and digital trade more generally, prioritizing national security interests over free trade principles …. The second example is its pullback on opposing import substitution policies—policies that aim to replace foreign imports with domestic production. Much like the digital trade barriers issue, this pullback seems to be in line with the Biden administration’s overall direction …. These actions are taken in the name of national security and equity—two worthwhile pursuits that aim to address some of today’s most pressing challenges. However, in adjusting its trade agenda so radically to fit the Biden administration’s policy picture, the United States risks running into major issues.” “2024 National Trade Estimate.” CSIS (April 5, 2024).

  • “As Washington escalates its raft of trade controls against China, the US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is likely to be a key piece of legislation impelling the momentum …. The US is mulling an end to the de minimis provision that allows shipments valued under US$800 to enter the world’s largest consumer market, a move largely aimed at Chinese exports …. The Biden administration has never quite succinctly enunciated its trade doctrine. Reindustrializing the country, de-risking, and an emphasis on labor rights and the environment have been moving parts of a vast policy machine …. A renewed focus on supply chains, which have become ever more complex and specialized as globalization has advanced, is at the core of this otherwise disparate agenda …. The Entity List, which had 20 companies until June 2023, has now grown to 30.” “U.S. Sets Trade Policy with China.” Hinrich (May 19, 2024).

  • “President Biden has intensified efforts to shield American industries from foreign competition in an election year …. The Biden administration has recently signaled they are preparing new tariffs and other measures to block cheap electric vehicles and other clean-energy imports from China. Those efforts, combined with new limits on American investment in China, restrictions on exports of advanced technology and subsidies for the U.S. semiconductor industry, have fueled major tensions with China …. The politics behind Mr. Biden’s strategy appears clear: When it comes to manufacturing, the president wants to leave no doubt that he is as much ‘America First’ as Mr. Trump, if not more.” “Biden’s Trade Moves.” New York Times (April 11, 2024)

  • “The Biden administration’s August 2023 executive order restricting a subset of outbound investment to China was an important step …. Washington must expand investment restrictions to include critical and emerging technologies …. It must also put an end to U.S. financial firms’ disturbing practice of offering publicly traded financial products, such as exchange-traded funds and mutual funds, that invest in Chinese companies that are on U.S. government blacklists. Using the current export controls on advanced semiconductors as a model, the Department of Commerce should reduce the flow of critical technology to China by introducing similar export bans.” “Competition with China.” Foreign Affairs (May / June 2024).

  • “The prospect of additional American tariffs comes as China has been seeking a rollback of some of the ones that Washington imposed on Chinese imports during the Trump administration …. It would “not be acceptable to the United States” for China to continue to pursue an export strategy that hurts American workers …. As the U.S. election approaching and former President Donald J. Trump proposing sweeping new tariffs, it was already unlikely that existing import levies would be lowered.” “China and Yellin Talks.” New York Times (April 8, 2024).

  • “Globalization itself took off in the 1990s, as technological advances made it easier and cheaper to do business internationally. China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001 seemed to cement the era …. For the W.T.O. (today), “reglobalization” is a more inclusive vision …. Russia, China, Iran and their allies, by contrast, tend to use the term to describe a new world order in which they play a greater role.” “Reglobalization.” New York Times (April 7, 2024).

  • “Yet in the face of change, America’s two protectionist presidents (Trump and Biden) retreated. Their formula has been to tax trade through higher tariffs, restrict the use of foreign inputs for American businesses …. The Biden administration recently compounded its mistakes by pulling back from negotiations in the World Trade Organization and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to define the rules of the future digital economy …. (Polls) show that the vast majority of Americans favor more trade and openness. For now, the best hope is putting the brakes on the Biden-Trump race toward obsolescence.” Zoellick, “The Biden-Trump Nostalgia.” Wall Street Journal (April 3, 2024).

  • Beijing has gone to the World Trade Organization to challenge the Biden administration’s signature Inflation Reduction Act …. China challenging tax credits that support US clean energy producers for breaking WTO rules …. When it comes from China, protectionism is understood to be the status quo. The rest of the world seems to simply accept that this is the starting point of China’s state capitalism .… The entire nature of China’s political economy goes against the free trade assumptions of the WTO, not to mention the Washington Consensus. “China’s Hypocrisy on Trade.” Financial Times (April 1, 2024).

  • “Chinese factories are flooding global markets …. That helps the Federal Reserve fight against inflation. But cost American manufacturing jobs …. and Biden administration’s election-year hopes.” “Chinese Imports.” Washington Post (March 31, 2024).

  • “A possible Trump victory in the 2024 election is not delighting oil and gas executives … Fossil fuel firms have found a lot to like in President Biden’s signature climate law, the Inflation Reduction Act, which Trump has vowed to unravel. The law offers lucrative tax credits for companies to capture and store carbon dioxide — subsidies that several oil giants are eager to exploit, even as they pump record amounts of crude oil and post near-record profits. “Big Oil, Trump and Trade War.” Washington Post (March 30, 2024).

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Biden, Trump & China Trade: Domestic & Geopolitics Politics — From Bad to Worse?

Posted on March 29, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

    This blog is an update of my previous one. It provides more quotes from recent articles commenting on U.S.-China trade relations.  As I said previously, to me, they highlight the broad and disturbing aspects of geopolitics and trade as we enter a new presidential election in the United States and seemingly a newer era off geopolitics.

 

  • “The Biden administration’s August 2023 executive order restricting a subset of outbound investment to China was an important step …. Washington must expand investment restrictions to include critical and emerging technologies …. It must also put an end to U.S. financial firms’ disturbing practice of offering publicly traded financial products, such as exchange-traded funds and mutual funds, that invest in Chinese companies that are on U.S. government blacklists. Using the current export controls on advanced semiconductors as a model, the Department of Commerce should reduce the flow of critical technology to China by introducing similar export bans.” “Competition with China.” Foreign Affairs (May / June 2024).

  • “The prospect of additional American tariffs comes as China has been seeking a rollback of some of the ones that Washington imposed on Chinese imports during the Trump administration …. It would “not be acceptable to the United States” for China to continue to pursue an export strategy that hurts American workers …. As the U.S. election approaching and former President Donald J. Trump proposing sweeping new tariffs, it was already unlikely that existing import levies would be lowered.” “China and Yellin Talks.” New York Times (April 8, 2024).

  • “Globalization itself took off in the 1990s, as technological advances made it easier and cheaper to do business internationally. China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001 seemed to cement the era …. For the W.T.O. (today), “reglobalization” is a more inclusive vision …. Russia, China, Iran and their allies, by contrast, tend to use the term to describe a new world order in which they play a greater role.” “Reglobalization.” New York Times (April 7, 2024).

  • “Yet in the face of change, America’s two protectionist presidents (Trump and Biden) retreated. Their formula has been to tax trade through higher tariffs, restrict the use of foreign inputs for American businesses …. The Biden administration recently compounded its mistakes by pulling back from negotiations in the World Trade Organization and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to define the rules of the future digital economy …. (Polls) show that the vast majority of Americans favor more trade and openness. For now, the best hope is putting the brakes on the Biden-Trump race toward obsolescence.” Zoellick, “The Biden-Trump Nostalgia.” Wall Street Journal (April 3, 2024).

  • Beijing has gone to the World Trade Organization to challenge the Biden administration’s signature Inflation Reduction Act …. China challenging tax credits that support US clean energy producers for breaking WTO rules …. When it comes from China, protectionism is understood to be the status quo. The rest of the world seems to simply accept that this is the starting point of China’s state capitalism .… The entire nature of China’s political economy goes against the free trade assumptions of the WTO, not to mention the Washington Consensus. “China’s Hypocrisy on Trade.” Financial Times (April 1, 2024).

  • “Chinese factories are flooding global markets …. That helps the Federal Reserve fight against inflation. But cost American manufacturing jobs …. and Biden administration’s election-year hopes.” “Chinese Imports.” Washington Post (March 31, 2024).

  • “A possible Trump victory in the 2024 election is not delighting oil and gas executives … Fossil fuel firms have found a lot to like in President Biden’s signature climate law, the Inflation Reduction Act, which Trump has vowed to unravel. The law offers lucrative tax credits for companies to capture and store carbon dioxide — subsidies that several oil giants are eager to exploit, even as they pump record amounts of crude oil and post near-record profits. “Big Oil, Trump and Trade War.” Washington Post (March 30, 2024).

  • Biden’s sophisticated economic nationalism is a very big deal, much more so than Trump’s protectionist thrashing ….  China just filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization about the Inflation Reduction Act, which, despite its name, is at its core an attempt to fight climate change …. China complained about electric vehicle subsidies that it says unfairly discriminate against production using car battery components made in China …. America’s new industrial policy does favor domestic production and — we’ll see — might be in violation of W.T.O. rules …. In 2022, the W.T.O. ruled that U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, imposed under Trump but retained under Biden, were illegitimate. The U.S. is also promoting semiconductor production …  And the Biden administration has imposed stiff limits on technology exports to China, with the clear goal of crimping Chinese technological progress in advanced semiconductors and computing …. Biden’s China policy is so tough that it makes me, someone who generally favors a rules-based system. Krugman, “Bidenomics and China.” New York Times (March 29, 2025).

  • China filed a complaint at the World Trade Organization over the U.S.’s Inflation Reduction Act, saying that it was discriminatory and distorted fair competition. The rules being challenged require vehicles to use parts from specific regions to qualify for subsidies while excluding products from China. Under the Inflation Reduction Act, consumers in the U.S. won’t be able to claim a $7,500 clean-vehicle tax credit if they buy cars containing battery components from a “foreign entity of concern” starting in 2024. The policy will extend to the minerals that go into battery components in 2025. “China Files WTO Complaint Against US Over EV Subsidies.” Wall Street Journal (March 27, 2024).

  • “After a long dormant period since the Washington Consensus of the 1980s, industrial policy is back and dramatically reshaping global manufacturing. As large-scale subsidies policies proliferate, countries that used to take a laissez-faire approach to market governance have entered a race to subsidize strategic sectors …. In response to China subsidies, President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS) amplified and implemented subsidies so attractive …. likened them to a gold rush.” “Trade Distortion and Protectionism — Fighting Subsidies with Subsidies.” Hinrich Foundation (March 26, 2024).

  • “The latest purchasing rules represent China’s most significant step yet to build up domestic substitutes for foreign technology and echo moves in the US …… Washington has imposed sanctions on a growing number of Chinese companies on national security grounds, legislated to encourage more tech to be produced in the US and blocked exports of advanced chips.” “Beijing Block Chips.” Financial Times (March 24, 2024).

  • “(US trade policy has become) rank protectionism. For instance, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s evocative picture of shielding a “narrow yard” of security-relevant technologies with “high fences” has expanded quickly into a much broader yard where any device or platform that collects information can be banned on security grounds, whether it be Chinese EVs or TikTok in the US or Apple and Tesla in China.” “Protectionism.” Financial Times (Marc 22, 2024).

  • “(The question is) if Washington’s bipartisan turn away (Nippon Steel case) from economic liberalism, in favor of state-directed investment strategies and trade protectionism, will ultimately help the economy.” “Bidennomics and the Nippon Steel – US Steel Dive.” Wall Street Journal (March 22, 2024).

  • “The U.S. may be slouching toward state capitalism (like China) in which government regularly intervenes in business to ensure it serves the national interest.” “U.S. and China-Style Capitalism.“ Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “The trend increasing state power (recent Supreme Court immigration case) will have far-reaching consequences not only for domestic politics but also for U.S. foreign policy …. (T)his shift will determine whether state-level action becomes a source of resilience or a destabilizing force. “Fractured Superpower — Federalism and Foreign Policy.”  Foreign Affairs (March 23, 2024).

    • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission as to China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has) the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

    • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

    • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

    • “The Biden administration has reasserted the role of the state in the US economy: subsidizing strategic industries, rethinking trade relations and rebooting competition policy.” “America and Industrial Policy.” Financial Times (Match 17, 2024).

    • “There is a pattern. The deep-seated US aversion to subjecting its domestic laws to international institutions or foreign courts is the same US exceptionalism that explains American hostility to the WTO’s judicial function. It also explains America’s refusal to join the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.” “When the US Fell out of Love with Geneva.” Hinrich Foundation (March 19, 2024).

    • “An American president opposing investment by a staunch ally (Nippon Steel) in a US manufacturing company (US Steel) is a sign that protectionism has run amok. What Biden should be focused on instead is the long-term prosperity of the American people. Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel would benefit the economy broadly and the working class specifically.” “Protectionism is Running Amok in the US.” Financial Times (March 18, 2024).

    • “The TixTox legislation sailed through the House … (A) court would require judges to weigh national security … The U.S. has long restricted foreign ownership in radio, television …. A federal court ruled against Commerce Dept. efforts to ban TikTok during the Trump administration (under the International Economics Powers Act) … Similar legislation unfolded when the Trump administration sought to ban WeChat.” “TixTox Ban and Free Speech.” Wall Street Journal (March 19, 2024).

    • “Huawei, China’s telecom and mobile-technology champion, is a poster child for the country’s high-tech ambitions—and a symbol of Washington’s determination to cut them down to size … It’s surprising resilience in the face of U.S. sanctions therefore says a lot about how the tech war is likely to unfold in the years ahead ….. But the further down the technological ladder sanctions extend, the more difficult they are to enforce—as the West has discovered with Russia since 2022.” “Huawei and Limits of U.S. Power.” Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission concerning China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

  • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

  • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

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National Security, Protectionism and U.S.-China Trade — Biden v. Trump 2.0 (Commentaries).

Posted on March 20, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     The quotes below are from articles that have appeared recently discussing Trump, global trade, national security, the WTO, U.S. trade policy, U.S-China trade, and U.S. foreign policy generally — seen through the prism of recent events and the current U.S. presidential race.

    To me, I find them particularly succinct. They highlight the broad and disturbing aspects of geopolitics and trade as we enter a new presidential election in the United States.

     The way these issues will play out will have immense impact on U.S. corporations as well as the United States (domestically and internationally), the global trade and political systems and in particular U.S.-China trade relations.

 

  • Biden’s sophisticated economic nationalism is a very big deal, much more so than Trump’s protectionist thrashing ….  China just filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization about the Inflation Reduction Act, which, despite its name, is at its core an attempt to fight climate change …. China complained about electric vehicle subsidies that it says unfairly discriminate against production using car battery components made in China …. America’s new industrial policy does favor domestic production and — we’ll see — might be in violation of W.T.O. rules …. In 2022, the W.T.O. ruled that U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, imposed under Trump but retained under Biden, were illegitimate. The U.S. is also promoting semiconductor production …  And the Biden administration has imposed stiff limits on technology exports to China, with the clear goal of crimping Chinese technological progress in advanced semiconductors and computing …. Biden’s China policy is so tough that it makes me, someone who generally favors a rules-based system. Krugman, “Bidenomics and China.” New York Times (March 29, 2025).

  • China filed a complaint at the World Trade Organization over the U.S.’s Inflation Reduction Act, saying that it was discriminatory and distorted fair competition. The rules being challenged require vehicles to use parts from specific regions to qualify for subsidies while excluding products from China. Under the Inflation Reduction Act, consumers in the U.S. won’t be able to claim a $7,500 clean-vehicle tax credit if they buy cars containing battery components from a “foreign entity of concern” starting in 2024. The policy will extend to the minerals that go into battery components in 2025. “China Files WTO Complaint Against US Over EV Subsidies.” Wall Street Journal (March 27, 2024).

  • “After a long dormant period since the Washington Consensus of the 1980s, industrial policy is back and dramatically reshaping global manufacturing. As large-scale subsidies policies proliferate, countries that used to take a laissez-faire approach to market governance have entered a race to subsidize strategic sectors …. In response to China subsidies, President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS) amplified and implemented subsidies so attractive …. likened them to a gold rush.” “Trade Distortion and Protectionism — Fighting Subsidies with Subsidies.” Hinrich Foundation (March 26, 2024).

  • “The latest purchasing rules represent China’s most significant step yet to build up domestic substitutes for foreign technology and echo moves in the US …… Washington has imposed sanctions on a growing number of Chinese companies on national security grounds, legislated to encourage more tech to be produced in the US and blocked exports of advanced chips.” “Beijing Block Chips.” Financial Times (March 24, 2024).

  • “(US trade policy has become) rank protectionism. For instance, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s evocative picture of shielding a “narrow yard” of security-relevant technologies with “high fences” has expanded quickly into a much broader yard where any device or platform that collects information can be banned on security grounds, whether it be Chinese EVs or TikTok in the US or Apple and Tesla in China.” “Protectionism.” Financial Times (Marc 22, 2024).

  • “(The question is) if Washington’s bipartisan turn away (Nippon Steel case) from economic liberalism, in favor of state-directed investment strategies and trade protectionism, will ultimately help the economy.” “Bidennomics and the Nippon Steel – US Steel Dive.” Wall Street Journal (March 22, 2024).

  • “The U.S. may be slouching toward state capitalism (like China) in which government regularly intervenes in business to ensure it serves the national interest.” “U.S. and China-Style Capitalism.“ Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “The trend increasing state power (recent Supreme Court immigration case) will have far-reaching consequences not only for domestic politics but also for U.S. foreign policy …. (T)his shift will determine whether state-level action becomes a source of resilience or a destabilizing force. “Fractured Superpower — Federalism and Foreign Policy.”  Foreign Affairs (March 23, 2024).

    • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission as to China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has) the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

    • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

    • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

    • “The Biden administration has reasserted the role of the state in the US economy: subsidizing strategic industries, rethinking trade relations and rebooting competition policy.” “America and Industrial Policy.” Financial Times (Match 17, 2024).

    • “There is a pattern. The deep-seated US aversion to subjecting its domestic laws to international institutions or foreign courts is the same US exceptionalism that explains American hostility to the WTO’s judicial function. It also explains America’s refusal to join the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.” “When the US Fell out of Love with Geneva.” Hinrich Foundation (March 19, 2024).

    • “An American president opposing investment by a staunch ally (Nippon Steel) in a US manufacturing company (US Steel) is a sign that protectionism has run amok. What Biden should be focused on instead is the long-term prosperity of the American people. Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel would benefit the economy broadly and the working class specifically.” “Protectionism is Running Amok in the US.” Financial Times (March 18, 2024).

    • “The TixTox legislation sailed through the House … (A) court would require judges to weigh national security … The U.S. has long restricted foreign ownership in radio, television …. A federal court ruled against Commerce Dept. efforts to ban TikTok during the Trump administration (under the International Economics Powers Act) … Similar legislation unfolded when the Trump administration sought to ban WeChat.” “TixTox Ban and Free Speech.” Wall Street Journal (March 19, 2024).

    • “Huawei, China’s telecom and mobile-technology champion, is a poster child for the country’s high-tech ambitions—and a symbol of Washington’s determination to cut them down to size … It’s surprising resilience in the face of U.S. sanctions therefore says a lot about how the tech war is likely to unfold in the years ahead ….. But the further down the technological ladder sanctions extend, the more difficult they are to enforce—as the West has discovered with Russia since 2022.” “Huawei and Limits of U.S. Power.” Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission as to China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has) the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

  • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

  • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

  • “The Biden administration has reasserted the role of the state in the US economy: subsidizing strategic industries, rethinking trade relations and rebooting competition policy.” “America and Industrial Policy.” Financial Times (Match 17, 2024).

  • “There is a pattern. The deep-seated US aversion to subjecting its domestic laws to international institutions or foreign courts is the same US exceptionalism that explains American hostility to the WTO’s judicial function. It also explains America’s refusal to join the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.” “When the US Fell out of Love with Geneva.” Hinrich Foundation (March 19, 2024).

  • “An American president opposing investment by a staunch ally (Nippon Steel) in a US manufacturing company (US Steel) is a sign that protectionism has run amok. What Biden should be focused on instead is the long-term prosperity of the American people. Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel would benefit the economy broadly and the working class specifically.” “Protectionism is Running Amok in the US.” Financial Times (March 18, 2024).

  • “The TixTox legislation sailed through the House … (A) court would require judges to weigh national security … The U.S. has long restricted foreign ownership in radio, television …. A federal court ruled against Commerce Dept. efforts to ban TikTok during the Trump administration (under the International Economics Powers Act) … Similar legislation unfolded when the Trump administration sought to ban WeChat.” “TixTox Ban and Free Speech.” Wall Street Journal (March 19, 2024).

  • “Huawei, China’s telecom and mobile-technology champion, is a poster child for the country’s high-tech ambitions—and a symbol of Washington’s determination to cut them down to size … It’s surprising resilience in the face of U.S. sanctions therefore says a lot about how the tech war is likely to unfold in the years ahead ….. But the further down the technological ladder sanctions extend, the more difficult they are to enforce—as the West has discovered with Russia since 2022.” “Huawei and Limits of U.S. Power.” Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “(O)ne going back to the 1980s has been his (Trump’s) conviction that the United States has been shafted by allies on trade, immigration and security.” “Disdain of U.S. Alliances.” New York Times (Feb. 16, 2024).

    • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission as to China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has) the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

    • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

    • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

    • “The Biden administration has reasserted the role of the state in the US economy: subsidizing strategic industries, rethinking trade relations and rebooting competition policy.” “America and Industrial Policy.” Financial Times (Match 17, 2024).

    • “There is a pattern. The deep-seated US aversion to subjecting its domestic laws to international institutions or foreign courts is the same US exceptionalism that explains American hostility to the WTO’s judicial function. It also explains America’s refusal to join the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.” “When the US Fell out of Love with Geneva.” Hinrich Foundation (March 19, 2024).

    • “An American president opposing investment by a staunch ally (Nippon Steel) in a US manufacturing company (US Steel) is a sign that protectionism has run amok. What Biden should be focused on instead is the long-term prosperity of the American people. Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel would benefit the economy broadly and the working class specifically.” “Protectionism is Running Amok in the US.” Financial Times (March 18, 2024).

    • “The TixTox legislation sailed through the House … (A) court would require judges to weigh national security … The U.S. has long restricted foreign ownership in radio, television …. A federal court ruled against Commerce Dept. efforts to ban TikTok during the Trump administration (under the International Economics Powers Act) … Similar legislation unfolded when the Trump administration sought to ban WeChat.” “TixTox Ban and Free Speech.” Wall Street Journal (March 19, 2024).

    • “Huawei, China’s telecom and mobile-technology champion, is a poster child for the country’s high-tech ambitions—and a symbol of Washington’s determination to cut them down to size … It’s surprising resilience in the face of U.S. sanctions therefore says a lot about how the tech war is likely to unfold in the years ahead ….. But the further down the technological ladder sanctions extend, the more difficult they are to enforce—as the West has discovered with Russia since 2022.” “Huawei and Limits of U.S. Power.” Wall Street Journal (March 21, 2024).

  • “A second Trump term would see American unilateralism on steroids.” “American Unilateralism,” Financial Times (Feb. 13, 2024).

  • “(A) second Trump administration will not only be fired by a desire for revenge and a radicalized Republican party. It will also inherit from Biden a state machinery schooled o a much darker view of the world than which Obama bequeathed to Trump.” “America’s Economic Security.” Financial Times (March 5, 2024).

  • “(U)”nless Washington recovers its commitment to a rules-based trading system, the organization (WTO) it painstakingly helped build over half a century to police international commerce will prove irrelevant to the new global challenges.” “World Trade Organization.” Washington Post March 4, 2024).

  • “At the top of my worry list for a second term (for Trump): an even more aggressively protectionist approach to trade.” “Economic Impact and Trump 2.0.” New York Times (Feb. 29, 2024).

  • “The main headwind for the global trading system has come in the form of a breakdown of the WTO’s dispute resolution system. .” “China and World Trade.” Financial Times (Feb. 27, 2024).

  • “The world has shifted away from decades of emphasizing private competition and has plunged into a new era of competitive policy.” “Bidenomics” New York Times (Feb. 29, 2024).

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Trade, National Security and Geopolitics — Trump v. Biden 2.0

Posted on March 12, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     The following are quotes from the many articles that have appeared recently discussing Trump, global trade, national security, the WTO, U.S. trade policy, China and foreign policy — seen through the prism of the current U.S. presidential race. To me, I find them particularly succinct. They highlight the broad and disturbing aspects of geopolitics and trade as we enter a new presidential election in the United States. The way these issues will play out will have immense impact on corporations as well as both the United States and the global system.

  • “(A) second Trump administration will not only be fired by a desire for revenge and a radicalized Republican party. It will also inherit from Biden a state machinery schooled o a much darker view of the world than which Obama bequeathed to Trump.” “America’s Economic Security.” Financial Times (March 5, 2024).

  • “(U)”nless Washington recovers its commitment to a rules-based trading system, the organization (WTO) it painstakingly helped build over half a century to police international commerce will prove irrelevant to the new global challenges.” “World Trade Organization.” Washington Post March 4, 2024).

  • “At the top of my worry list for a second term (for Trump): an even more aggressively protectionist approach to trade.” “Economic Impact and Trump 2.0.” New York Times (Feb. 29, 2024).

  • “The main headwind for the global trading system has come in the form of a breakdown of the WTO’s dispute resolution system. .” “China and World Trade.” Financial Times (Feb. 27, 2024).

  • “The world has shifted away from decades of emphasizing private competition and has plunged into a new era of competitive policy.” “Bidenomics” New York Times (Feb. 29, 2024).

  • “(The recent filing of a Section 301 case by labor in the U.S. International Trade Commission as to China’s subsidies to its ship building sector has) the potential to reignite the U.S.-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it.” “Shipping as the New Battleground in the US-China Trade War.” Financial Times (March 13, 2024).

  • “Everyone knows the Trump-Biden election campaign is going to be nasty, brutish and not short enough, but the unknown is how much policy damage it will do. One unfolding example is the fiasco of self-destructive opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel. The American political consensus used to be that foreign investment is a sign of U.S. economic strength and a source of good-paying jobs …. But now they’re targeting even investment in U.S. manufacturing from friendly countries.” “Nippon Steel Fiasco.” Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2024). “

  • (The new ‘Washington Consensus’) calls for a mix of tariffs and subsidies to support domestic industries … Freewheeling global trade helped lower consumer prices but at the expense of U.S. workers and national security.” “Retreating Further on Free Trade.” Wall Street Journal (March 17, 2024).

  • “The Biden administration has reasserted the role of the state in the US economy: subsidizing strategic industries, rethinking trade relations and rebooting competition policy.” “America and Industrial Policy.” Financial Times (Match 17, 2024).

  • “There is a pattern. The deep-seated US aversion to subjecting its domestic laws to international institutions or foreign courts is the same US exceptionalism that explains American hostility to the WTO’s judicial function. It also explains America’s refusal to join the International Criminal Court and other international bodies.” “When the US Fell out of Love with Geneva.” Hinrich Foundation (March 19, 2024).

  • “An American president opposing investment by a staunch ally (Nippon Steel) in a US manufacturing company (US Steel) is a sign that protectionism has run amok. What Biden should be focused on instead is the long-term prosperity of the American people. Nippon’s acquisition of US Steel would benefit the economy broadly and the working class specifically.” “Protectionism is Running Amok in the US.” Financial Times (March 18, 2024).

  • “The TixTox legislation sailed through the House … (A) court would require judges to weigh national security … The U.S. has long restricted foreign ownership in radio, television …. A federal court ruled against Commerce Dept. efforts to ban TikTok during the Trump administration (under the International Economics Powers Act) … Similar legislation unfolded when the Trump administration sought to ban WeChat.” “TixTox Ban and Free Speech.” Wall Street Journal (March 19, 2024).

 

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IS CHINA TRADE STRATEGY A RESPONSE TO U.S. TRADE LAWS?

Posted on February 27, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

    A new hypothesis seems to be emerging concerning China’s trade policies and U.S. law, which I agree with to some extent. That China’s global trade policies are in response, in part, to restrictions and other actions under U.S. trade law.  An outstanding article recently appeared in the Financial Times (2.27.24) discussing this correlation between China trade policies and U.S. law. More work needs to be done to fully explore this very interesting law and policy observation. Here are a few excerpts from this lengthy analysis:

 

  • Even during the first blush of the honeymoon period that attended China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, it was clear that Washington and Beijing were — as a Chinese idiom has it — “sharing a bed but dreaming different dreams”.
  • As the world trade body falters, China is accelerating efforts to construct an alternative trade architecture that is insulated from US influence and centered upon the developing world.
  • The architecture under construction revolves around a China-centric network of bilateral and regional “free trade agreements” (FTAs), which allow for trade at low tariffs while also promoting direct investment flows, Chinese officials and trade experts say.
  • This alternative is mainly based on the BRI, to which China is progressively trying to shift its exports from traditional markets like the US and EU.”
  • The dysfunction of the WTO’s appellate body — the top appeals court for world trade — has meant that many multibillion-dollar trade disputes sit in legal limbo, making commerce more costly and complicated. Most analysts do not foresee drastic scenarios such as the demise of the WTO.
  • But it was after the US excluded China from talks to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a big multilateral trade deal that was signed in 2016, that Beijing really threw its FTA program into overdrive.

 

  • China does not wish to see the demise of globalisation as represented by the WTO. On the contrary, Beijing has been a clear beneficiary of trade liberalization over more than two decades, enjoying more than a 10-fold increase in its total trade since its 2001 accession to the world trade body, vastly outstripping the global average by several times. But in spite of all the effort that Beijing has expended in building its alternative trade architecture, the current escalation of trade friction with both the US and EU means that China remains gravely exposed to risks that global trade.

 

  • During the administration of Donald Trump, which ended in 2021, the US imposed tariffs on some $300bn in Chinese exports. EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager said this month the bloc was “absolutely willing to use” trade tools to tackle unfair Chinese trade practices.
  • With so much uncertainty hanging over the future, Chinese companies are taking pre-emptive measures to skirt whatever trade altercations are coming their way.
  • Chinese companies are seeking to circumvent US and EU tariffs in a number of different ways. One of these ways is transshipment, a method that is fully on display in Mexico, which as a member of North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) can export goods to the US market at much lower tariffs than China can access.
  • Another trend is for “nearshoring” — or the relocation of production capacity closer to customers to limit vulnerability to geopolitical tensions — which is reconstituting China’s global footprint. Chinese direct investment flows into Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries seen as useful “nearshoring” countries have been on the rise.
  • But even here, Chinese investors are not necessarily safe. “China’s FTAs can facilitate Chinese companies to set up factories and manufacturing plants in foreign countries to eventually export to the US and EU,” says Liu. “But if laws in the US and EU change to include additional restrictions on Chinese ownership of factories outside of China, Chinese factory migration may eventually prove to be not as effective,” she adds.

                      “China World Trade.” Financial Times (Feb. 27, 2024).

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National Security Council & Trade Policy — New Major Player in Global Trade Relations.

Posted on February 21, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

       It has become evident recently that national security has become a major driving-force in formulating U.S. economic policy generally (semiconductor subsidies) and in particular U.S. trade policy (including proposals for related climate change issues, international digital taxation, supply chain security and revitalizing domestic industries).  So it is no surprise that the National Security Council has become a major player in formulating trade policies. And in particular, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Economic Affairs has taken the lead,

      This development clearly got a jump-start with President Trump (trade and tariff wars) and has continued to gain momentum during the Biden administration (newer restrictions on both China and Russia). However, this is particularly the case with U.S. – China trade relations (newer tariff and investment restrictions) but includes trade relations with the EU (battery and EV subsidies) and Japan (proposed Nippon Steel and U.S. steel merger).

      A good article discussing a particularly interesting issue is the rising role of the Deputy National Security Adviser at the National Security Council, trade policy and trade negotiations. This appeared in today’s New York Times. Here are a few excerpts from this timely article.

  • Leading the way for the administration is Mr. Pyle, an under-the-radar aide on the National Security Council who is leaving the administration at the end of this month after more than three years in the White House. Mr. Pyle played an outsize role in putting in place and selling Mr. Biden’s vision of global economic cooperation and confrontation to often-skeptical allies.
  • Pyle’s tenure as deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs included putting together some operational details of an untried effort to restrict Russian revenues from global oil sales. It spanned a range of administration attempts to forge a global alliance to outcompete China.
  • The deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs leads negotiations on declarations at international summits, often working months in advance to smooth over disagreements with allies.
  • Biden, he said, “is advancing a new model for today’s challenges, and one that tests old rules with new types of solutions. That’s hard.”

                                 “Biden’s Global Economic Policy.” New York Times (Feb. 21, 2024)

My newer article ……Malawer, “Under Trump and Biden has the US Become a Protectionist and National Security Trading State?” (SSRN 2024). To be published May 1st in China and WTO Review (Korea).

 

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