As China imposes even stricter controls over export of rare-earth minerals, new fees on U.S. ships using Chinese ports, newer antitrust investigations of U.S. firms, newer sanctions on Korean shipping subsidiaries in the U S. — Trump has now turned again to threaten China with even greater tariffs (including threatening the cancellation of the upcoming summit). This all provides even more background and need to assess the likelihood of U.S. congressional action and Supreme Court actions to deter or even roll back Trump’s tariffs — based on either IEEPA (National Emergency) or Section 232 (National Security) — involving country-specific or product-specific tariffs.

     I personally think it will be the federal courts (with the Supreme Court agreeing with the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals) that Trump’s actions will be declared illegal — not by Congressional action. But this is certainly not guaranteed. The use of the ‘shadow docket’ has raised grave concerns even among federal judges from both parties.

     If the courts do not act, Congress needs to act. It can take various actions according to the different statutes relied upon by the Trump administration. States and their legislatures should consider putting pressure on their congressional representatives to take action and to pass necessary legislation. For example, declaring the end of declared national emergencies and amending existing trade statutes.

    It is probably an even bet that the Supreme Court will rule against Trump’s grab for power. Even given the conservative and politicized nature of the Supreme Court today such an outcome may still be possible. Hopefully. But maybe not. We’ll see ………….

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“The president has free rein to impose whatever tariffs he wishes and that is likely to persist for some time.

• The Congress will not step in, not very soon and not completely reversing US policy to adopt a no additional tariff policy, not perhaps even later,
• the Supreme Court will, more likely than not, support the president on his tariffs,
• the markets have not forced a change, and seem unlikely to do so soon, and
• the key players – EU, after UK, and Japan, then Korea, went along with the US tariffs, and did not retaliate, giving permission through negotiations for the tariffs.

• In the long run, there will be a change back to more open trade, but not for the present. The situation with Congress and the courts, and in international trade relations can and will likely change as well, but not now. Economic forces will in the end prevail …. Effective in August 2025, the U.S. implemented new reciprocal tariffs ranging from 10% to 41% on many trading partners …. As for tariffs affecting specific products, there is no end in sight to the section 232 cases, an authority relating to the nation’s security. Under section 232, the administration has levied tariffs targeting specific industries or products, regardless of the country of origin. (Note: Some have special conditions or exceptions) …. There is no end in sight to more tariffs being imposed by product under section 232 with resulting greater uncertainty for trade. There are additional back-up statutes for imposing tariffs: section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as well as the never used section 338 of the Trade Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley). Unlikely to be used is section 122 of the 1974 Act, the balance of payments authority, as it is specifically limited in The Court of international trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions (7-4) were decided correctly on the law as it now stands. It is likely that the Supreme Court will back the President (60-40 or better odds). It is likely that a decision for the President will be clothed in the Foreign Affairs power together with the declarations of national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) enacted in 1977. The courts have never overturned an emergency under this Act, close to seventy of them before the second Trump Administration. The courts have rarely opposed the president on a major national security matter. An exception, in Youngstown Steel v US, the Supreme Court ruled against President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills in the face of a labor strike during the Korean War …. There has not been a direct consolidated response directly to the US tariffs. The UK, the EU, Japan and Korea have entered into bilateral arrangements with the US recognizing the new reality in their trading relations …. None of the disciplines that might have been expected have restrained the US President …. The US is only 13% of world imports, so much of the world’s countries for the time-being will continue to trade among themselves as they have in the past.” “Trump Tariff Policy – With No Brakes this Time.” Petersen IIE (October 9, 2025).

• “Dozens of sitting judges shared their concerns about risks to the courts’ legitimacy as the Supreme Court releases opaque orders about Trump administration policies …. At issue are the quick-turn orders the Supreme Court has issued dictating whether Trump administration policies should be left in place while they are litigated through the lower courts. That emergency docket, a growing part of the Supreme Court’s work in recent years, has taken on greater importance amid the flood of litigation challenging President Trump’s efforts to expand executive power. While the orders are technically temporary, they have had broad practical effects …. The emergency docket is known to its critics as the shadow docket, and its rise as a flashpoint for tensions in the judiciary coincides with the Supreme Court’s increasing use of it in ways that have benefited Trump’s agenda.” “Federal Judged Warn of Shadow Docket.” New York Times (10.11.25).