Dr. Stuart Malawer and Joint Resolution of Recognition by the Virginia General Assembly (2024).

Posted on June 7, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Recognition upon being honored by a Joint Resolution of the Virginia Genera Assembly 

 

                            From the Journal of East Asis and International Law 

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U.S. Agriculture, Trade Wars, Exports and Subsidies — Still Problems for Smaller Farms.

Posted on June 6, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

      The U.S. agricultural sector benefits from historically extensive subsidies legislation as well as new legislation under the Biden administration. Exports are of great significance. Trump’s tariff wars with China caused a great number of losses that were paid back by additional federal government payments to farmers. But problems remain especially as to small and family-owned farms. Recent antitrust reviews by the government, which have been rare, have been commenced.

 

…. “Over time, the federal government abandoned a policy of managing production to support prices, prompting growers to become more export-oriented while local distribution networks atrophied …. The last half-decade has been more disruptive than most. First came a trade war against China under former President Donald J. Trump, which drew retaliatory tariffs that cut into U.S. exports of farm products like soybeans and pork …. That’s where the American Rescue Plan, the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law come in …. The laws have collectively provided about $60 billion to the Agriculture Department, which has parceled it out across a variety of priorities …. Another bottleneck strangling smaller farmers has been the availability of meat and poultry processors, an industry that has been consolidated under huge companies like Cargill and Tyson Foods. To fix it, the Agriculture Department has reinvigorated enforcement of long-neglected antitrust laws …. {Some are] pushing for the new funding to be continued in the coming Farm Bill. They want billions more to help transfer land from retiring farmers to small operators rather than corporations, and for the Agriculture Department to set up an Office of Small Farms to oversee it all.” “Billions in New Subsidies and Family Farms.” New York Times (June 3, 2024).

 

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Stuart Malawer, Commentaries on Trump and Biden Tariffs (2017- 2024) — From Bad to Worse?

Posted on May 31, 2024 by Stuart Malawer
“JEAIL Interview with Dr. Malawer on U.S. Tariff History (Historical Stages) and Trump – Biden Tariffs.” (YIJUN Institute of International Law in Korea) (June 2024).
Commentaries in the China and WTO Review and the Journal of East Asia and International Law. 2017-2024.

 

.…. Most recent article .………….

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TARIFFS & U.S. TRADE STRATEGY — BIDEN’S & TRUMP’S —- Similar but Really Different — But is an Integrated Strategy & Consensus Now Emerging?

Posted on May 20, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

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     Trade wars and tariffs have become central to U.S. foreign and trade policies under both Trump and Biden— And even more central to this current campaign season.  It’s really important to look closely at what has happened over the last eight years and what is currently transpiring during this campaign season. There are differences between Biden and Trump and there are some basic economic factors that are in play, even if both fail to adequately note them. But an integrated U.S. tariff and trade strategy is emerging, for example promoting chip and battery production (and employment growth).  A movement away from free trade and more protectionism. The Biden administration is leading the charge with a focus on national security and something of a national industrial policy. With Trump proposing even more extensive policy changes.

“Tariffs aimed at protecting America’s solar industry from foreign competition snapped back into place, ending a two-year pause that President Biden approved as part of his effort to jump-start solar adoption in the U.S. The tariffs, which will apply to certain solar products made by Chinese companies in Southeast Asia.” “Tariffs to Protect Solar Sector.” New York Times (June 7, 2024).

“Both men, as they vie for a second White House term, say that tariffs on imported Chinese goods are needed to promote domestic manufacturing and to clap back at China’s zero-sum trade practices ….  Biden’s tariffs on $18 billion in Chinese electric vehicles, batteries and computer chips, announced last month, are likely too small to lift the economy’s overall price level, economists said. But Trump’s plan for 60 percent tariffs on all $427 billion in goods that China ships to the United States each year would almost certainly reshape trade in ways that consumers would notice.” “Biden and Trump Embrace Tariffs.” Washington Post (June 7, 2024).

“Tariff policy has gone through three distinct phases since the 1700s …. From independence until the Civil War the purpose of tariffs was mainly revenue: They accounted for 90% of federal receipts. From the Civil War until the Great Depression, the purpose was restriction: protecting northern manufacturers …. A third era began with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934 empowering the president to negotiate lower duties if other countries did the same. Reciprocity remained the dominant paradigm after World War II as presidents of both parties sought to knock down other countries’ trade barriers …. The tariffs he imposed on China and to which President Biden just added are a different animal altogether. They are partly about restriction and reciprocity—protecting nascent industries and prodding China to change its ways. But the more fundamental goal is realignment: diversifying U.S. trade away from China …. Tariffs are more than taxes. They are also an instrument of geopolitical competition. Nonetheless, like all taxes, they impose costs that need to be weighed against their benefits.” “Tariffs and Geopolitics (Historical Stages of U.S. Tariffs.” Wall Street Journal (May 31, 2024).


“As an integral part of economic policy, trade must also be a part of any social contract; it must undergo its own transformation ….  This is not a call for trickle-down economic policy, but a call for economic policy to serve the interests of working people ….  Trade policy has long followed the trickle-down approach that has been so common over the past four decades …. We must also recognise its limits to do the same when it comes to trade. A laissez-faire system has allowed short-term profit-driven businesses to maximise their gains, often by partnering with a non-market autocracy to further that goal …. This is why the Biden-Harris administration’s approach to trade has been to democratise economic opportunity. “Biden’s Newer U.S. Trade Policy – Rejection of ‘Trickle Down’.” Financial Times (May 28, 2024).

“Chinese firms trying to buffer themselves from Washington’s anti-China policies are rebranding and creating U.S.-domiciled businesses to sell their wares as the Biden administration expands the government entity lists that restrict Chinese companies’ business dealings in the U.S., say policymakers and national-security experts.” “Blacklisted Chinese Companies Rebrand.” Wall Street Journal (May 29, 2024).

“{If Trump wins] Economically, an “America first” strategy would feature protectionism and predation. The United States would remain engaged in the global economy. But it would seek to dramatically rebalance the burdens and benefits of that involvement. There would be no more tolerating asymmetric discrimination by trade partners, even democratic allies.“ “Trump’s ‘America First World’ if He Wins.” Foreign Affairs.” (May 27, 2024).

“There are different kinds of tariff strategies …. Trump used tariffs as a blunt tool in a single-prong strategy to reduce the US trade deficit with China, but for Biden they are part of a much broader plan. This aims not only to tackle Chinese mercantilism, the global economic and political fallout from it and the failure of the existing trade system to address it, but also to expand capacity in key areas like semiconductors and clean tech.” “Not all U.S. Tariffs are Equal.” Financial Times (May 20, 2024).

“A new report from the U.S. trade representative’s office finds that President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products reduced Americans’ real incomes and depressed investment but didn’t increase manufacturing employment (under Section 301 actions). FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION: CHINA  (USTR 2024) …. George W. Bush was one of many presidents who imposed tariffs on imported steel …. Barack Obama placed tariffs on Chinese tires, costing Americans an estimated $900,000 per job saved …. Presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Obama, however, sought to liberalize trade generally, believing that a coordinated opening of markets would boost all economies …. The big change in U.S. trade policy under Trump and Biden is that there’s no longer any big-picture effort to move toward freer trade.” “Trump and Biden Tariffs.” Washington Post (May 22, 2024). See also, “FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION: CHINA”  (USTR 2024).

“The new tariffs President Biden announced last week aren’t economically significant. Symbolically, they are huge. The U.S. buys almost no electric vehicles, steel or semiconductors—all targets of the tariffs—from China …. It signals that the decoupling of the Chinese and U.S. economies is becoming irreversible. More important, the tariffs are the final piece of an economic strategy for competing with China. This strategy is a three-legged stool. The first consists of subsidies to build a viable technology manufacturing sector. The second is tariffs on Chinese imports that threaten those efforts. The third is restrictions on access to money, technology and know-how that could help China compete …. The strategy that has ultimately emerged is largely the work of Sullivan …. He sees trade, domestic economic policy and security as integrated.” “U.S. China Pivot – Tariffs and New Strategy.” Wall Street Journal (May 21, 2024).

 “A small increase in prices on goods subject to tariffs suggests that retailers absorbed much of the cost. Absorption by retailers and wholesalers would mean that the tariffs function as a tax on businesses … Even if businesses end up absorbing some or most of the tariff, economists still see that imposing a cost. Firms faced with higher prices might have to lay off workers or hold off on expansions. That could sap overall growth and ultimately still affect consumers …. The primary effect is a regressive tax on consumers.”  “Tariffs and Who Pays.” Wall Street Journal (May 20, 2024).

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New Article — Malawer, “Growing Reliance on Protectionism & National Security in U.S. Trade Policy.”

Posted on May 19, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

 Malawer, “National Security, Protectionism and U.S. Trade.” Journal of East Asia and Internatinal Law No. 1, 50 (May 2024).

 

Click to access jeail_v17n1_11.pdf

 

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U.S. Historical Flirting with Restrictive Tariffs & Now its Revival — Harmful to U.S. Competitiveness & Consumers?

Posted on May 18, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     

    Historically, the United States has flirted with protectio0nism –from its founding, the early 1800’s, from the Civil War in the 1860’s, in the 1930’s, and more recently in the 1980’s (concerning Japan).  It is now doing the same (concerning China). The historical assessment of restrictive U.S. tariff policy is that it really hasn’t helped in nation-building or keeping U.S, industry globally competitive. It’s a big negative. It raises costs to consumers, generates ill will, inflationary and fosters inefficiencies. The newest element, concerns over national security (while sometime valid), but often overused, is a development now more warranted by geopolitical developments in the 21st century. And now most important in formulating global business policies and strategies. Geopolitical risks to business are now extraordinary. Here are various comments concerning tariffs and their impact …..

 

  • “Biden’s decision to codify and escalate tariffs imposed by Trump made clear that the United States has closed out a decades-long era that embraced trade with China and prized the gains of lower-cost products over the loss of geographically concentrated manufacturing jobs. A single tariff rate embodies that closure: a 100 percent tax on Chinese electric vehicles ….  Despite their mutual embrace of forms of protectionism,  Biden and Trump are offering voters contrasting views of how the American economy should engage with China …. Some think that consumption is the end, my view is production is the end …. Economists who continue to favor less restricted trade with China have criticized both candidates’ plans and not simply because they risk raising prices for American shoppers …. could slow economic growth.” “New Tariffs on China.” New York Times (May 9, 2024).

  • “The 19th century was a time when governments relied on tariffs for a significant portion of their income and free traders did not envisage sweeping away all tariffs. Instead, they wished them to be set at levels designed solely to raise revenue …. The U.S. in 1861 the first major power to buck the free-trade trend with the reintroduction of a draconian tariff regime (which was quickly made harsher still by the need to finance the Civil War). This was also simply reversion to type: In the U.S., some form of nation-building protectionism has, on and off, been part of the policy mix since its experience of war and blockade earlier in the 1800s.” “When Free Trade Was Progressive.” Wall Street Journal (May 18, 2024).
  • “President Biden came out swinging this week when he announced a series of steep tariffs on Chinese imports, including 25 percent on certain steel and aluminum products, 50 percent on semiconductors and solar panels and 100 percent on electric vehicles …. We’ve been here before. In the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations worried about the fact that Japan was dumping cheap cars onto our market. The response then was voluntary export quotas, which allowed Japanese entry into the market in a way the new tariffs will not. Japanese competition ultimately forced U.S. car manufacturers to innovate.” “Electric Vehicles Shouldn’t be Luxury Items.” New York Times (May 18, 2024).
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BIDEN & TRUMP — WHO IS MOST WRONG ON TARIFFS?

Posted on May 14, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     What we are now seeing in U.S. trade policy is a race to the bottom — Who will come up with the worse trade restrictions? Biden or Trump. Developments the last week or so clearly highlight the wrong direction that trade policy actions and proposals have taken during this disturbing campaign season. Here are a number of recent commentaries.

  • “Joe Biden unleashed fresh tariffs on billions of dollars of Chinese goods on Tuesday, sharply raising the levies on clean energy imports including solar parts and electric vehicles ….  The US president is not only keeping the tariffs on $300bn worth of Chinese goods that his predecessor Donald Trump imposed as part of his trade war against Beijing in 2018 but adding more, targeting strategic industries …. The new tariffs follow other recent moves to protect US manufacturing and blue-collar jobs, including Biden’s opposition to the takeover of Pittsburgh-based US Steel by Japanese company Nippon Steel ….  The Biden administration has also enacted billions of dollars of subsidies for green and clean industries, with tax credits designed to unleash a new wave of investment in clean tech manufacturing.” “Biden’s New China Tariffs.” Financial Times (May 16, 2024).
  • “U.S. President Joe Biden unveiled a new slew of U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports on Tuesday. The White House cited “unacceptable risks” posed by Beijing flooding the global market. Around $18 billions of imported goods will be affected, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, steel and aluminum, critical minerals, medical products, and solar panels. Biden also said he would maintain tariffs, originally established under former U.S. President Donald Trump, on more than $300 billions of Chinese goods …. Among some of the key changes, the White House plans to quadruple electric vehicle duties to more than 100 percent, double taxes on solar cells and semiconductors, and place a 50 percent tariff rate on hospital syringes and needles …. Biden’s announcement signals the latest escalation in a trade war that began under Trump and has since become a key campaign issue ahead of the November U.S. presidential election. Trump routinely raised tariffs on Chinese goods during his tenure. He has since proposed a 10 percent tax on all imports from all countries as well as a tax of at least 60 percent on all Chinese goods, including a 200 percent tax on Chinese vehicles manufactured in Mexico …. Biden has criticized Trump’s “across-the-board tariffs” while also toughening his own economic posturing on China.” “Trade Frictions.” Foreign Policy (May 14, 2024).  
  • “ The biggest increase will be the quadrupling of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100 percent from 25 percent. That move is aimed at shielding a corner of the American automotive industry that is in line to receive hundreds of billions of dollars in federal subsidies to help the United States transition to a clean-energy future …. Mr. Trump has promised to go even further if he wins in November — restricting investment between the two countries and banning some Chinese products from the United States entirely. He has also promised to apply that approach more broadly by subjecting all imports, regardless of their origin, to an additional 10 percent tariff …. The zero-sum game of industrial policy that both countries are engaged in, coupled with the looming U.S. election season, has reached its inevitable culmination in the form of escalating tariffs …. Many economists oppose tariffs because they tend to act as an effective tax on domestic consumers, by raising prices.” “Biden and Higher Tariffs.” New York Times (May 15, 2024).
  • “Beijing instructs local governments to help the chosen industries. The assistance takes the form of cheap land for factories, new highways for freight trucks, bullet train lines and other infrastructure …. The auto sector is a prime example of how China has been able to move so fast to gain manufacturing dominance ….China’s top leaders have heavily subsidized the research and production of battery electric cars for the past 15 years …. The November election has put political pressure on President Biden to show that he is taking a tough stand toward China. Trade issues have also become enmeshed with security concerns.” “How China Rose to Lad World in Cars and Solar Panels.” New York Times (May 15, 2024).
  • “The two men, locked in a rematch election this fall, share a rhetorical fondness for beating up on China’s economic practices, including accusing the Chinese of cheating at global trade …. But Mr. Biden’s trade war differs from Mr. Trump’s in important ways. Mr. Trump was trying to bring back a broad swath of factory jobs outsourced to China. Mr. Biden is seeking to increase production and jobs in a select group of emerging high-tech industries — including clean energy sectors, like electric vehicles, that Mr. Trump shows little interest in cultivating. “Biden and Trump Tariffs – Different Aims.” New York Times (May 15, 2024).
  • “President Biden on Monday ordered a company with Chinese origins to shut down and sell the Wyoming cryptocurrency mine it built a mile from an Air Force base that controls nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. The cryptomining facility, which operates high-powered computers in a data center near the F.E. Warren base in Cheyenne, ’presents a national security risk to the United States’ (under CFIUS) …. Cryptomining operations are housed in large warehouses or shipping containers packed with specialized computers that typically run around the clock, performing trillions of calculations per second, hunting for a sequence of numbers that will reward them with new cryptocurrency.”  “Biden and Chinese Bitcoin Mines Restricted.” New York Times (May 15, 2024).
  • “The Administration is using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the same law Mr. Trump invoked to impose tariffs to cajole Beijing to change its mercantilist behavior …. China does present a special challenge for U.S. trade policy because it’s an adversary that often doesn’t play by global rules. Targeted trade policy that punishes IP and cyber theft and protects national security is justified …. The Biden tariffs are a classic example of how bad industrial policy is compounded by another bad policy in the name of fixing the first mistake.” “Biden Starts a Green Trade War.” Wall Street Journal (May 15, 2024).
  • “One day after news broke that President Biden was planning to raise tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to roughly 100%, Donald Trump moved to one-up his rival for the White House. ‘I will put a 200% tax on every car that comes in from those plants.’ The retort put on display a dynamic now at the heart of U.S. trade policy: The leaders of both political parties are racing each other to impose tough barriers on trade with China. What was once a lone effort by Trump to disrupt the bipartisan faith in free trade has become an establishment consensus of its own …. Biden’s decision caps years of tortured debate within the administration over the tariffs Trump originally put in place on more than $300 billion in imports from China. Those duties, implemented in 2018 and 2019 and augmented by Biden’s new steps, are now a seemingly permanent feature of U.S. policy toward China. Biden also weighed concerns from economic advisers who viewed some of the Trump-era tariffs as unstrategic and potentially inflationary …. The fact is that no one wants to look weak on China …. These tariffs are the culmination of clashing industrial policies between the two countries and also the looming election season in the U.S.” “Trump and Tariffs.” Wall Street Journal (May 14, 2024).
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BIDEN – TRUMP TARIFF WARS — MORE COMING?

Posted on May 11, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

The Trump-Biden 2.0 presidential race this year is leading down the road to competitive protectionism. Here’s various quote from recent article discussing this unfortunate, and all too obvious, development.

…. “Donald Trump famously and proudly declared himself Tariff Man during his presidency …. President Joe Biden is now seizing the moniker …. Biden’s anticipated refocusing of Trump tariffs first rolled out in 2018 to target Chinese electric vehicles will mark yet another escalation in the US trade relationship with China …. The US is already an active combatant in the EV wars thanks to the billions of dollars in subsidies being rolled out thanks to Biden’s embrace n of industrial policy …. Those subsidies and similar ones for semiconductors will likely remain more consequential economically than even 100% tariffs on Chinese EVs given the US imports very few actual vehicles from China …. Like Trump’s promise of even more — appear mainly to be about politics and this year’s election …. Just how much these latest tariffs will alter the US economic competition with China or US automakers and consumers’ shift to EVs will take years to determine.” ”Biden and Tariff Man Trump.” Bloomberg (May 13, 2024).

…. “The Biden administration is discussing raising tariffs on some Chinese goods, including electric vehicles, in an attempt to bolster the U.S. clean-energy industry …. Biden administration officials, long divided over trade policy, have left in place Trump-era tariffs on roughly $300 billion of Chinese goods …. Chinese EVs are already subject to a 25% tariff, Raising that tariff, which comes on top of a 2.5% tariff on auto imports …. Trade with China is quickly emerging as a major issue in the 2024 presidential contest.” “Biden and Tariffs on EVs.” Wall Street Journal (May 11th, 2024).

….“The Biden-Trump trade war is simply accelerating the erosion of the open trading system created by the U.S. in the anti-Soviet era …. Trump would find little legal authority to impose a general and nondiscriminatory tariff; he and other presidents, in contrast, are absurdly supplied with legislative pretexts for favor-factory-style protectionism, the kind guaranteed to provoke tit-for-tat retaliation. This isn’t the 1930s but the risk goes up when nations are under internal stress ….Trump trade folly at least could hardly be as gratuitous as the folly Mr. Biden seems determined to commit. Mr. Biden shows every sign of wanting to start a global trade war.” “Whose Trade War is Worse — Biden’s or Trump’s?” Wall Street Journal (May 11, 2024).

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U.S. – China Trade Relations — Getting Worse?

Posted on May 2, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Trade relations between the U.S. and China continue to be strained and seemingly getting a bit worse. The threat and possibility of a new Trump administration, new legislation concerning a possible mandated forced sale of TikTox, new U.S. subsidies to the Chip industry, and litigation concerning the solar imports — all contribute to a nasty trade environment. Here are a few quotes from recent news accounts ………….

 

  • “TikTok filed its suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that selling its U.S. operations was not commercially, technologically, or legally feasible …. National security concerns about TikTok are speculative and fall short of what’s required to justify violating First Amendment rights …. Fears of a potential security threat from TikTok have escalated in the last year and a half, prompting bans of the app on federal devices and those issued by some city and state governments.” “TikTok Sues U.S. Government.” New York Times (May 8, 2024). 

  • “Donald Trump’s economic advisers are eyeing aggressive new legal justifications to impose tariffs on all imports …. But the Constitution gives power over both taxation and regulation of foreign commerce to Congress, which complicates the extent to which the president can impose tariffs through executive action …. In addition to the 10 percent “universal” tariff, Trump has proposed pushing import duties on China as high as 60 percent …. One option, based on a 1977 law, gives the president power over international commerce if the chief executive determines the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, the economy or foreign policy ….  The other option is a 1930 law that allows presidents to impose duties on countries that “have discriminated against the commerce of the United States.” …. A third option is to cite a 1974 law that gives the executive branch authority to act in retaliation against foreign trade practices, which was the power Trump relied on for tariffs against China in his first term.” “Plans to Muscle Up for a Global Trade War.” Washington Post (May 8th, 2024).

  • America’s collective national body is suffering from a chronic case of China anxiety …. Congress has moved to force the sale of TikTok, the Chinese-owned social media application; some states have sought restrictions on Chinese individuals or entities owning U.S. land and on Chinese researchers working in American universities; and the federal government has barred certain Chinese technology firms from competing in our markets. These measures all have a national security rationale …. Chinese students are questioned and researchers traveling to and from China on the grounds that they may be agents of the Chinese state ….  If the United States is to properly compete with China, it’s going to require healthy, balanced policymaking that protects U.S. national security. “Take a Deep Breath About China.” New York Times (May 6, 2024).

  • “The economic cost to Beijing of Trump’s tariffs, retained by Biden, is real. Chinese companies slapped with tariffs exported less to the U.S. …. The damage to China’s gross domestic product from the trade war was three times as high as the hit to the U.S. …. Trump has said that if re-elected, he might impose tariffs of up to 60% on imports from China.”  “Rematch of Trump vs. China.” Wall Street Journal (May 2, 2024).

  • “Biden’s signing of the law started a 270-day clock, which could extend to a full year, during which the government has ordered TikTok to be sold to a non-Chinese buyer. If ByteDance does not divest by then, the administration said it would work to block TikTok from Apple’s and Google’s app stores …. But the law could be weakened by the fact that the United States does not ban foreign ownership of U.S. media companies. The Federal Communications Commission voted in 2013 to relax its long-standing rule concerning foreign investment in radio and TV …. Trump’s effort to ban the app in 2020 was overturned by federal judges who said the government had not shown sufficient proof of harm to justify violating Americans’ speech freedoms. Montana’s statewide TikTok ban was halted last year by a federal judge who said it carried a pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment and violated the Constitution in more ways than one.” “TixTox and Legal War.” Washington Post (April 28, 2024).

  • “With recent multi-billion-dollar grants to Intel, TSMC, Samsung, and Micron, the US government has now spent over half its $39bn in Chips Act incentives …. Production would be roughly enough for the needs of critical infrastructure like datacenters and telecoms …. Japan and Europe are investing in foundational chip capacity …. Critics worry all these incentives create a subsidy race — but this began well before the Chips Act. A 2019 OECD study found that between 2014 and 2018 at least two US companies received more money from a foreign government than from the US …. Equity investors will debate whether these new investments can deliver an adequate financial return. Policymakers who see the Chips Act as an insurance policy against geopolitical shocks believe it is already paying dividends.” “Success of CHIP Act.” Financial Times (April 26, 2024).

  • “The Biden administration has used the Inflation Reduction Act and other policies to try to revive the U.S. solar manufacturing industry. That has spurred more manufacturing of solar panels …. A group of solar manufacturers have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce to investigate potentially illegal trade practices by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam and impose higher tariffs on products they export to the United States. The complaint focuses on companies that have their headquarters in China …. In addition to the allegations in the petition, solar manufacturers have raised concerns about the use of forced labor in production of polysilicon in China and other Southeast Asian countries.”  “Solar Panels & U.S. Manufacturing.” New York Times (April 24, 2024).

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Local / State Land Restrictions & U.S. National Security — Is this Really a National Security Issue or Merely Politics? Will They Withstand Legal Challenges?

Posted on April 29, 2024 by Stuart Malawer

     Chinese investment in U.S. farmland has now become a political issue. The relationship between state and federal law concerning foreign ownership of farmland has now become a constitutional issue as well. Local land use requirements, especially foreign ownership, have been traditionally a matter of state and local law. Federal cases are already being filed contesting new state restrictions as violating separation-of- powers and blatant racism — and a misuse reliance on national security. A recent piece in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times highlight this emerging issue.

 

  • “More than three dozen states have enacted or are considering laws restricting land purchases by Chinese citizens and companies, arguing that such transactions are a growing threat to national security …. State lawmakers have been especially worried about Chinese investment in agricultural land and territory near military installations ….. Chinese interests own less than 1 percent of foreign-held agricultural land in the United States …. Civil rights groups have challenged these laws in federal court on grounds that they violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act, and that they undercut the federal government powers on foreign affairs …. These laws  recalled the alien land laws from the early 20th century, which effectively prohibited Asian immigrants from buying farmland and, in some cases, homes in many states.” “When Buying a Home Is Treated as a National Security Threat.” New York Times (May 7th, 2024).

  • “From Florida to Indiana and Montana, an expanding array of local proposals, bills, laws and regulations aim to block Chinese individuals and companies from acquiring land, winning contracts, working on research, setting up factories and otherwise participating in the U.S. economy …. Virginia Governor Youngkin says he opposed the Ford plant for electric-vehicle batteries because he didn’t want to allocate Virginia taxpayer money to support Chinese technology …. Gov. Youngkin said issues such as land use are state-level decisions, in Virginia’s case sometimes affecting national-security assets …. The land issue is particularly knotty. The federal government says Chinese entities are the registered owners of under 1% of the foreign-held agricultural land in the U.S., with 87% of that owned by five companies. …. Florida has legislated some of the most far-reaching China decoupling …. To detractors, the anti-China measures can be unnecessary, poorly conceived and ineffective political grandstanding, sometimes even racist or unconstitutional …. Several efforts have faced legal challenges. “States Take On China in the Name of National Security.” Wall Street Journal (April 29, 2024).

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