Protectionism, subsidies and industrial policy are expanding both in the United States and other countries. This is a newer development in the landscape of global trade. The question now is will this continue or will countries begin to understand, once again, that in the end this is very poor policy. Recent protectionism has utilized national security and other non-economic rationales. Often relating to industrial policies, subsidies, tariffs, export controls, digital date flow, Internet apps and restricting foreign ownership (in land, specific sectors and companies) and restricting certain outward flows and investment. This is particularly pronounced in U.S.-China trade relations. And has become a leading issue in Trump v. Biden 2.0.  Protectionism often goes along with isolationism and nationalism. Here’s a various comments concerning this unfolding story of 2024, focusing on U.S. legal developments.

• “Nippon Steel … has been asked to provide more information about the transaction with U.S. Steel to the Department of Justice (as to antitrust implications) …. It has also called attention to the ultimate arbiter of the merger: the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) …. It appears to be the 1980s all over again — when anxiety over trade with Japan ran high …. The committee could argue that there are national security concerns related to any loss of U.S. control over domestic steel supplies.” “U.S. Steel – Nippon Steel and CFIUS (National Security).”New York Times (May 4^th, 2024).

• “Data indicate that the impact of the China Shock on US manufacturing jobs is not significant post-2011 …. Politicians advocating for economic nationalist policies are basing their trade policy decisions on evidence that no longer holds …. Imports from the leading emerging economies, excluding China, have made a positive contribution to US manufacturing employment over the past decade …. US policymakers would do well to pivot their focus toward our comparative advantage in tradable services, rather than prioritizing efforts to bring back lost manufacturing jobs …. Reactionary protectionism can inflict even greater harm than foreign imports on American workers and businesses …. America’s challenge is to find effective ways to build a strong economy that captures the positive aspects of globalization. “How Imports Support American Jobs.” Hinrich (Georgetown Study) (April 2024).

• “Biden’s signing of the law started a 270-day clock, which could extend to a full year, during which the government has ordered TikTok to be sold to a non-Chinese buyer. If ByteDance does not divest by then, the administration said it would work to block TikTok from Apple’s and Google’s app stores …. But the law could be weakened by the fact that the United States does not ban foreign ownership of U.S. media companies. The Federal Communications Commission voted in 2013 to relax its long-standing rule concerning foreign investment in radio and TV …. Trump’s effort to ban the app in 2020 was overturned by federal judges who said the government had not shown sufficient proof of harm to justify violating Americans’ speech freedoms. Montana’s statewide TikTok ban was halted last year by a federal judge who said it carried a pervasive undertone of anti-Chinese sentiment and violated the Constitution in more ways than one.” “TixTox and Legal War.” Washington Post (April 28, 2024).

• “With recent multi-billion-dollar grants to Intel, TSMC, Samsung, and Micron, the US government has now spent over half its $39bn in Chips Act incentives …. Production would be roughly enough for the needs of critical infrastructure like datacenters and telecoms …. Japan and Europe are investing in foundational chip capacity …. Critics worry all these incentives create a subsidy race — but this began well before the Chips Act. A 2019 OECD study found that between 2014 and 2018 at least two US companies received more money from a foreign government than from the US …. Equity investors will debate whether these new investments can deliver an adequate financial return. Policymakers who see the Chips Act as an insurance policy against geopolitical shocks believe it is already paying dividends.” “Success of CHIP Act.” Financial Times (April 26, 2024).

• “The Biden administration has used the Inflation Reduction Act and other policies to try to revive the U.S. solar manufacturing industry. That has spurred more manufacturing of solar panels …. A group of solar manufacturers have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce to investigate potentially illegal trade practices by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam and impose higher tariffs on products they export to the United States. The complaint focuses on companies that have their headquarters in China …. In addition to the allegations in the petition, solar manufacturers have raised concerns about the use of forced labor in production of polysilicon in China and other Southeast Asian countries.”  “Solar Panels & U.S. Manufacturing.” New York Times (April 24, 2024)

• “A group of seven leading solar manufacturers filed trade complaints formally requesting that the Biden administration impose tariffs on solar products being exported from Southeast Asia into the United States …. The petitions were filed with the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission …. Chinese companies have been relocating production of solar products to neighboring countries to avoid existing tariffs …. The trade complaints are focused on imported solar cells, the parts of solar panels that turn light into electricity …. The call for new tariffs comes as the Biden administration has been increasingly vocal in its complaints about China’s excess industrial capacity.”  “Solar Companies File Petition for New Tariffs.” New York Times (April 25, 2024).

• “In January, 50 members sent a letter to Tai, Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan, and Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Jonathan Kanter, expressing concern over US digital trade policy …. The 2024 edition of NTE, however, was quickly identified as missing at least two key types of information compared to past publications …. While previous NTE reports consistently included foreign digital trade rules, especially data localization mandates and ex ante competition regulations, the 2024 edition either removed these points entirely or significantly restructured the language that highlighted such barriers. Second, the NTE also reduced its opposition to import substitution policies …. After more than three years in office, patience with Tai has worn thin.” “USTR’s Agenda.” Hinrich (April 23, 2024)

• “Under the House bill (passed April 20^th, 2024) ByteDance would have up to 360 days to divest TikTok. If it declined or failed to do so during that time, mobile app stores would be prohibited from offering the app to users, effectively banning it nationwide. The bill explicitly targets TikTok and ByteDance, but would give the president the power to impose a similar ultimatum against other apps …. (But the House bill) is likely to face significant legal hurdles (in the Senate), as have previous attempts by the Trump administration and states to force a sale or ban of the app.” “House TikTok Ban.” Wahington Post (April 21, 2024).

• “Poor trade policy decisions by the Biden administration, like the two-year solar tariff moratorium, have allowed China to severely undermine the law and continue to cement its dominance …. the solar industry …. The Biden administration’s clean energy tax credits and subsidies are estimated to be worth $600 billion to $1.2 trillion over a decade. However, industry officials have complained …. that some of the tax credit rules are too loose, allowing solar companies to claim credits even if they import components and assemble the panels in the U.S.” “Chinese Exports and U.S. Solar Industry.” New York Times (April 21, 2024).

• “Mr. Biden is weighing new measures to protect nascent industries like electric-vehicle production and solar-panel manufacturing from Chinese competition …. Biden called for higher tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum products and announced a new trade investigation into China’s heavily subsidized shipbuilding industry.” “China and US Industry Makeover.” New York Time (April 19, 2024).

• “Digital rights groups and others around the world have taken notice — and raised the question of how the moves against TikTok contradict the United States’ arguments in favor of an open internet …. Any U.S. TikTok ban or sale would require officials to explain why the measure was different from efforts in other countries to restrict the flow of digital data inside their borders …. The United States has pushed for data to be able to flow between countries unhindered.” “TikTox and Open Internet.” New York Times (April 19, 2024).

• “Steel and aluminum tariffs are not good for the U.S. manufacturing sector or its workers. That’s because many fewer workers are employed by firms that make these metals than they are by firms that use these metals as a product input …. As president, Biden has extended (almost) all of Trump’s tariffs — or in the case of steel and aluminum, swapped out some of the tariffs for slightly different trade barriers (such as import quotas). Biden has extended those Trump tariffs even when doing so conflicts with other parts of his economic agenda, such as increasing competition …. The Biden administration is vigorously defending his predecessor’s tariffs in court.” “Biden’s Trade Policy and Trump’s.” Washington Post (April 19, 2024).

• “After years of complaints about China’s subsidies of private and state-owned industries, the United States and Europe have increasingly copied Beijing’s playbook, undertaking multibillion-dollar industrial policies …. The United States passed two mammoth bills in 2022 to strengthen its domestic semiconductor industry (Chips Act) and renewable energy sector (Inflation Reduction Act) …. President Biden called for major increases in some tariffs on steel and aluminum products from China …. Positive appraisals of industrial policies have grown in recent years …. What stands out about this current resurgence is that there is a reliance on costly subsidies. These are often combined with other types of discriminatory measures against foreign firms.” “Countries Rever to Protectionism.” New York Times (April 17, 2024).

• “Biden is proposing to triple the 7.5% tariff under Section 301 on certain Chinese steel and aluminum imports. He also teed up a trade investigation into Chinese shipbuilding in response to a petition by the union ….  Biden has scrapped nearly every Trump policy, he has maintained most of his predecessor’s tariffs despite their economic harm …. China’s mercantilism is a special trade problem, but Chinese steel makes up only 2% of U.S. imports and 0.6% of consumption, largely owing to Trump’s tariffs and antidumping duties. Trump has proposed a 10% tariff on all imports.  Biden on Wednesday reaffirmed his opposition to Nippon Steel’s purchase of U.S. Steel.  Tariffs and subsidies may prop up uncompetitive companies for a time, but they harm countless forgotten men.”  “Race to be Protectionist-in-Chief.” Wall Street Journal (Lead Editorial) (April 18, 2024). 

• “President Biden called for raising tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from China, beginning what is expected to be a broadside of protectionist steps against Beijing …. Biden’s move comes as the administration is studying raising tariffs on a range of Chinese exports to the U.S., including electric vehicles, batteries and solar products …. China’s response to the backlash has been to decry rising protectionism, arguing their exports are the result of market dynamics …. The U.S. Trade Representative will also open an investigation into Chinese shipbuilding practices.” “New Biden Tariff on Chinese Steel.” Wall Street Journal (April 17, 2024).

• “Under the committee’s (CFIUS) statutory analytical framework, Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel poses no national-security risk to the U.S. …. Nothing in this steel-making transaction risks compromising cutting-edge technology, critical infrastructure, sensitive data or the defense industrial base’s supply chain …. Nippon Steel’s investment in U.S. Steel promises to enhance American production capacity and strengthen geopolitical ties between the U.S. and Japan in the face of Chinese aggression. Japan is of indispensable strategic importance, not least because of its supporting U.S.-led export controls.”  “CFIUS and U.S. Steel Acquisition.” Wall Street Journal (April 16, 2024).

• “The panel that reviews foreign investments (CFIUS) will get new powers to obtain information and levy higher fines under a proposal from the Treasury Department, a move that comes amid intense official scrutiny on U.S.-China investment flows. The proposal announced Thursday would allow Cfius, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., to more easily subpoena companies involved in corporate acquisitions and to expand the types of information it can require they turn over …. President Biden in 2022 ordered Cfius to scrutinize transactions that could give adversaries access to critical technologies or endanger supply chains and personal data.” “Treasury Proposal and CFIUS.” Wall Street Journal (April 12, 2024).

• “In response to national security and geopolitical concerns, there has been a renewed focus on foreign investment in the US, including investment in real estate. At the federal level, in 2018, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was given expanded authority to review certain types of real estate transactions by foreign investors. Additionally, in recent years, the passage of state legislation restricting or prohibiting investment in US real property by foreign individuals, companies, and governments has surged …. While some states already had laws restricting foreign investment, primarily in agricultural land, a recent CFIUS decision has led to an increase in proposed state laws restricting foreign investment more broadly. In 2022, CFIUS determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review an acquisition of land by a Chinese-owned company …. This decision generated significant national security discourse across the US.” “State Law and Foreign Ownership of Land.” Reuters (April 1, 2024).