IS CHINA TRADE STRATEGY A RESPONSE TO U.S. TRADE LAWS?

    A new hypothesis seems to be emerging concerning China’s trade policies and U.S. law, which I agree with to some extent. That China’s global trade policies are in response, in part, to restrictions and other actions under U.S. trade law.  An outstanding article recently appeared in the Financial Times (2.27.24) discussing this correlation between China trade policies and U.S. law. More work needs to be done to fully explore this very interesting law and policy observation. Here are a few excerpts from this lengthy analysis:

 

  • Even during the first blush of the honeymoon period that attended China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, it was clear that Washington and Beijing were — as a Chinese idiom has it — “sharing a bed but dreaming different dreams”.
  • As the world trade body falters, China is accelerating efforts to construct an alternative trade architecture that is insulated from US influence and centered upon the developing world.
  • The architecture under construction revolves around a China-centric network of bilateral and regional “free trade agreements” (FTAs), which allow for trade at low tariffs while also promoting direct investment flows, Chinese officials and trade experts say.
  • This alternative is mainly based on the BRI, to which China is progressively trying to shift its exports from traditional markets like the US and EU.”
  • The dysfunction of the WTO’s appellate body — the top appeals court for world trade — has meant that many multibillion-dollar trade disputes sit in legal limbo, making commerce more costly and complicated. Most analysts do not foresee drastic scenarios such as the demise of the WTO.
  • But it was after the US excluded China from talks to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a big multilateral trade deal that was signed in 2016, that Beijing really threw its FTA program into overdrive.

 

  • China does not wish to see the demise of globalisation as represented by the WTO. On the contrary, Beijing has been a clear beneficiary of trade liberalization over more than two decades, enjoying more than a 10-fold increase in its total trade since its 2001 accession to the world trade body, vastly outstripping the global average by several times. But in spite of all the effort that Beijing has expended in building its alternative trade architecture, the current escalation of trade friction with both the US and EU means that China remains gravely exposed to risks that global trade.

 

  • During the administration of Donald Trump, which ended in 2021, the US imposed tariffs on some $300bn in Chinese exports. EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager said this month the bloc was “absolutely willing to use” trade tools to tackle unfair Chinese trade practices.
  • With so much uncertainty hanging over the future, Chinese companies are taking pre-emptive measures to skirt whatever trade altercations are coming their way.
  • Chinese companies are seeking to circumvent US and EU tariffs in a number of different ways. One of these ways is transshipment, a method that is fully on display in Mexico, which as a member of North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) can export goods to the US market at much lower tariffs than China can access.
  • Another trend is for “nearshoring” — or the relocation of production capacity closer to customers to limit vulnerability to geopolitical tensions — which is reconstituting China’s global footprint. Chinese direct investment flows into Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries seen as useful “nearshoring” countries have been on the rise.
  • But even here, Chinese investors are not necessarily safe. “China’s FTAs can facilitate Chinese companies to set up factories and manufacturing plants in foreign countries to eventually export to the US and EU,” says Liu. “But if laws in the US and EU change to include additional restrictions on Chinese ownership of factories outside of China, Chinese factory migration may eventually prove to be not as effective,” she adds.

                      “China World Trade.” Financial Times (Feb. 27, 2024).

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National Security Council & Trade Policy — New Major Player in Global Trade Relations.

       It has become evident recently that national security has become a major driving-force in formulating U.S. economic policy generally (semiconductor subsidies) and in particular U.S. trade policy (including proposals for related climate change issues, international digital taxation, supply chain security and revitalizing domestic industries).  So it is no surprise that the National Security Council has become a major player in formulating trade policies. And in particular, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Economic Affairs has taken the lead,

      This development clearly got a jump-start with President Trump (trade and tariff wars) and has continued to gain momentum during the Biden administration (newer restrictions on both China and Russia). However, this is particularly the case with U.S. – China trade relations (newer tariff and investment restrictions) but includes trade relations with the EU (battery and EV subsidies) and Japan (proposed Nippon Steel and U.S. steel merger).

      A good article discussing a particularly interesting issue is the rising role of the Deputy National Security Adviser at the National Security Council, trade policy and trade negotiations. This appeared in today’s New York Times. Here are a few excerpts from this timely article.

  • Leading the way for the administration is Mr. Pyle, an under-the-radar aide on the National Security Council who is leaving the administration at the end of this month after more than three years in the White House. Mr. Pyle played an outsize role in putting in place and selling Mr. Biden’s vision of global economic cooperation and confrontation to often-skeptical allies.
  • Pyle’s tenure as deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs included putting together some operational details of an untried effort to restrict Russian revenues from global oil sales. It spanned a range of administration attempts to forge a global alliance to outcompete China.
  • The deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs leads negotiations on declarations at international summits, often working months in advance to smooth over disagreements with allies.
  • Biden, he said, “is advancing a new model for today’s challenges, and one that tests old rules with new types of solutions. That’s hard.”

                                 “Biden’s Global Economic Policy.” New York Times (Feb. 21, 2024)

My newer article ……Malawer, “Under Trump and Biden has the US Become a Protectionist and National Security Trading State?” (SSRN 2024). To be published May 1st in China and WTO Review (Korea).

 

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TRUMP’S FOREIGN POLICY 2.0 — Back to the 1930’s and America First.

     Trump’s foreign policies for a second term are now coming into focus as he strives for another term.  Thoughtful article appeared recently in the Wall Street Journal surveying the possibilities including a new 10% tariff on all imports, tougher policies concerning Iran, rapprochement with North Korea, more aggressive trade approach with China (revoking Most-Favored-Nation treatment), and a general a more protectionist and restrictive national-interest approach to foreign policy — which includes more aggressive unilateralism and retreat from multilateral institutions and agreements.

     In another words, a form of isolationism 2.0 resembling but worse than that of the 1930’s and ‘America First’ — that kept us from confronting Nazi Germany for years.  The following are comments from the above article:

  • Trumps foreign-policy agenda is coming into sharper relief following the incendiary suggestion that he would encourage Russia to attack NATO nations that fall short on defense-spending goals. Trump’s views largely track those of his first term.
  • Trump’s conviction that America has been taken advantage of long predates his election in 2016, and he has helped to intensify an isolationist strain in the GOP, while suppressing the appetite in both parties for multilateral trade accords. Expanding the Abramson Accords in the Middle East.
  • Broadly, Trump has proposed a 10% tariff on all imported goods, a move business and economic leaders say would be devastating for the U.S. economy, and he has floated much higher rates for China. He is itching for a tariff fight with European carmakers and has promised to once again withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Climate Accords. He has declared that Biden’s fledgling economic cooperation pact with 13 Indo-Pacific countries would be dead on arrival.
  • On Iran, Trump would return to the tougher policies of his first term, when he terminated the Obama-era accord to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump allies have said it is likely he would seek new sanctions, but the candidate hasn’t been specific about how he would handle current hostilities.
  • To expand on the Abraham Accords, a marquee achievement of his first term that forged Israeli relations with several Arab states. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, played a central role in negotiating the accords. Kushner, who started a private-equity firm that has raised money from Saudi, Emirati and Qatari investors, has said he wouldn’t rejoin the White House if Trump won a second term.
  • Trump would also have to deal with an increasingly bellicose North Korea, which U.S. officials say is now supplying weapons to Russia. Trump was initially hostile to Kim, promising in 2017 that threats would be “met with fire and fury like the world has never seen,” but he then sought a high-stakes rapprochement that failed to achieve a deal.
  • Mixed approach to China. Trump has promised an even more aggressive approach on trade, saying he wants to revoke normal trading relations, a legal step that would automatically raise levies on everything from toys and aircraft to industrial materials. He has talked of tariffs exceeding 60%.

                  “Trump Foreign Policy 2.0.” Wall Street Journal (Feb. 17, 2024).

See my Recent Article –Malawer, “Under Trump and Biden Has the U.S. Become a Protectionist and National Security Trading State.” (SSRN 2024)
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TRUMP AND TARIFFS 2.0 — More Protectionism, Unilateralism and National Security Rationale.

Two recent articles addressed trade issues concerning the Trump / Biden reliance on tariffs and recent focus on national security and protectionism. They conclude that protectionism shrinks rather than expands production. And one of the biggest shifts in US trade policy has been the reversal of the US support for the international system. With a reliance on protectionism, unilateralism and national security rationales. My conclusion is that cross-party insurrection by Conservatives and Progressive came full blown during the era of the Trump-Biden trade policies. The issue now is how much further will this play out if there is a Trump 2?

Farah Stockman, “Unlikely Co-Conspirators in the Fight Against Free Trade.” NEW YORK TIMES (January 17, 2024.

Phil Gramm and Donald J. Boudreau, “The High Cost of the Trump-Biden Tariffs.” WALL STREET JOURNAL (January 17, 2024).

…….See my commentaries on US-trade relations during the Trump-Biden era published in the CHINA AND WTO REVIEW (2017-2024)

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Stuart Malawer — Books / Awards — Int’l Law (1974 – 2024)

            Stuart Malawer ………. Some Books & Awards.

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TRUMP TRADE POLICY 2.0 (2025) — Protectionist Chaos & Trade War.

 Two outstanding articles appeared the same day in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal discussing the likely tragic consequences of a Trump victory in 2024 in the area of trade relations.

            Hayashi, “Trump is Primed for a Trade War in a Second Term, Calling for ‘Eye-for-Eye Tariffs’.” WALL STREET JOURNAL (December 26, 2023). https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-is-primed-for-a-trade-war-in-a-second-term-calling-for-eye-for-eye-tariffs-aff5bec5

            Salvage, J. Swan and M Haberman, “New Tax on Imports and a Split from China: “Trump’s 2025 Trade Agenda.” NEW YORK TMES (December 26, 2023). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/us/politics/trump-2025-trade-

 Here are two very worthwhile quotes:

         “Donald Trump upended U.S. trade policy during his first term, launching a tariff war with China …. Trump has been stocking an arsenal of protectionist measures for a potential second term ….”  Y. Hayashi, “Trump is Primed for a Trade War in a Second Term, Calling for ‘Eye-for-Eye Tariffs’.” WALL STREET JOURNAL (December 26, 2023). https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-is-primed-for-a-trade-war-in-a-second-term-calling-for-eye-for-eye-tariffs-aff5bec5

          “Former President Donald J. Trump is planning an aggressive expansion of his first-term efforts to upend America’s trade policies if he returns to power in 2025.” C. Salvage, J. Swan and M. Haberman, “New Tax on Imports and a Split from China: “Trump’s 2025 Trade Agenda.”  NEW YORK TMES (December 26, 2023). https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/26/us/politics/trump-2025-trade-

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BIDEN’S TRADE POLICY: National Security & Protectionism.

   Here’s a recent article of mine on Biden’s trade policy now focusing on national security and protectionism. This builds upon Trump’s policies and foreshadows Trump’s newer policies if he is reelected. This is somewhat worrisome. The following is an abstract of that article. The following link brings you to the entire article now posted on SSRN.

  • Geopolitical risk is now among the most important factors in the formulation of multinational corporate strategy and US trade policy. This is most clearly seen in US-China trade relations. The US has aggressively enacted national-security-based trade sanctions, which recently include export controls on semiconductor chips and restrictions on outbound and inbound investment. The US has also adopted major legislation providing historical subsidies and tax breaks, for example, in promoting semiconductor chip manufacturing and supporting advanced battery technology development and production. Congress and the courts have (somewhat unexpectedly) upheld the president’s use of national security as a basis of trade actions and generally supported his protectionist policies. Trade should not be restricted or weaponized. Global and national rules need to be strengthened and, perhaps, a bit updated, but protectionism in the name of national security is a losing argument. The growing movement by the US to rely more on national security and protectionism in formulating trade policy is a very worrisome development.
  • Biden’s Trade Policy: National Security & Protectionism.” (2024) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4672276
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Best US Cities for International Business.

 

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New ranking of US cities for international business just released by the Financial Times (November 2023), This is a must read for foreign investors thinking about investment in the United States. Needless to say, cities in Texas and Florida lead the nation. However, Boston and Bew York ran highly. |The Best US Cities for International Business in 2023.”

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Stuart Malawer — 46 Years of Teaching at George Mason University (Law School & Public Policy) — Global Trade, Int’l Law & National Security Law.

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Ceremony at Geoge Mason University celebrating my 46 years of teaching at GMU. Please click here for the video (2021).

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Most Toxic Issue Today — US-China Trade Relations: National Security and Economic Issues.

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US-China trade is one of the most toxic issues today. It raises legal, political, economic and national security issues. The following is a reprint of the recent editorial in the New York Times (Sept. 24, 2023) on the necessity of improving US – China Trade relations. Really outstanding. 

                                           The U.S. Is Pulling Back From China. How Far Is Too Far?

                                                                New York Times (Sept. 23, 2023)

By The Editorial Board

Many Americans, even once-ardent proponents of globalization, have soured on trade with China. But there is a growing danger that as the United States tries to address its difficulties with China, it will pull back too far, severing economic ties that benefit American families and contribute to global peace and prosperity.

The relationship problems are real, and cannot be minimized. Chinese industrial subsidies, often maintained despite promises to the contrary, stripped millions of jobs from America’s industrial heartland. Chinese companies flagrantly steal American innovations. China’s increasingly confrontational posture toward the United States and its allies — including the economic support it is providing for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — have underscored the need for the United States to align trade policy more closely with other aspects of America’s national interest. In an example of the prevailing mood in Washington, Representative Mike Gallagher, the Wisconsin Republican who serves as the chairman of the pointedly named “Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party,” recently called for broad prohibitions on U.S. investment in China, writing in an essay published in The Washington Post that “we are quite literally funding our own potential destruction.”

A new rule book is needed. Too few leaders, however, appear willing to note that Americans also benefit from trade with China, that the two nations are economically intertwined whether they like it or not, and that it is in America’s interest for the rest of the world to prosper. Americans bought almost $40 billion of Chinese toys, games and sports equipment last year. Soybean farmers in the Upper Midwest sold a record $16.4 billion of their beans to China, mostly for pig feed. Intel takes profits from low-end chips it makes and sells in China to fund the high-end chips it sells in America and to its allies. Hundreds of millions of Chinese have come out of poverty thanks to global trade, and have become consumers of U.S. goods and services. Cummins, an engine maker based in Indiana, operates 21 factories in China, and earns a fifth of its profits from its operations there. “Our success in China has led to global success and U.S. job growth,” Jon Mills, a spokesman for the company, recently told the Times reporter Alexandra Stevenson.

Amid the harsh talk, the dollar value of American trade with China — Americans buying Chinese products and the Chinese buying American products — rose to a record in 2022. The goal of American policymakers ought to be safeguarding the vast majority of those trade flows while addressing the problems that have emerged.

The Biden administration’s top priority in its dealings with China is, as it should be, national security. The president has emphasized the need to limit China’s access to advanced technologies with military applications. An executive order recently signed by Mr. Biden that restricts American investment in Chinese firms that work on artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing is a measured and necessary intervention. The government’s push to provide subsidies for the domestic production of semiconductors is also a sensible policy. The United States needs to secure reliable access to critical materials.

Hawkish politicians from both parties and American companies that stand to gain from protectionist policies, however, are pushing for a broader retreat from trade with China. Donald Trump, whose dim view of trade helped to propel his successful presidential candidacy in 2016, and who is again the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024, is promising to “tax China to build up America.” After the Biden administration suspended tariffs on some Chinese solar panels to accelerate America’s conversion to renewable energy, Senate Democrats and Republicans joined in a vote to reimpose the tariffs. “This vote was a simple choice: Do you stand with American manufacturers and American workers, or do you stand with China?” said Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio. Mr. Gallagher’s committee, with bipartisan support, has been investigating whether U.S. financial giants like BlackRock and MSCI invested in blacklisted Chinese firms, a warning shot aimed at Wall Street.

The Biden administration describes its approach to trade limitations as “small yard, high fence,” meaning that it is aiming to restrict China’s access to a small number of advanced technologies. But some strictures on trade, notably the broad tariffs on Chinese imports first introduced by Mr. Trump and maintained by President Biden, already go too far, imposing costs on American households without much benefit to them or national security.

Keeping the yard from getting bigger is also likely to prove difficult. During Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s recent visit to China, the country’s leading mobile phone manufacturer, Huawei, provocatively released a new smartphone powered by an advanced chip made in China most likely using American technology and machinery. A group of House Republicans sent a letter to the Biden administration citing the phone’s release as evidence of the need for tighter restrictions on China’s access to advanced chips. But China’s ability to make serviceable smartphones does not threaten America’s national security. Restraint is the best policy here. The United States has a legitimate interest in limiting China’s access to military technology, not in preventing the Chinese from checking email.

And while high walls are sometimes essential, so too are broad bridges. It is important to create real penalties for bad behavior by China, but it is also important to reward good behavior. Just as in the United States, there is a debate inside China between trade hard-liners and reformers. America has natural allies among those in China who understand that Beijing has to change and can succeed by playing by the rules.

Defending trade is politically fraught in part because so many American leaders underestimated the impact of China’s rise on American workers and failed to ensure that the benefits were broadly shared.

That failure has changed Americans’ views of how our country relates to the rest of the world. A recent study reports that younger Americans are more skeptical than previous generations that trade is mutually beneficial for participating nations, part of a broader turn toward zero-sum thinking — the belief that gains for one group tend to come at someone else’s expense. The authors argue that the outlook of older generations was shaped by an era of higher growth, in which it seemed plausible that everyone’s boat would rise. Younger generations, by contrast, have been embittered, and policymakers can rebuild support for trade only by addressing those past failures.

The United States can do that by pursuing economic relationships with the world that include protections for the environment and for workers. Other nations will continue to provide industrial subsidies, and the United States can use similar policies to develop new industries, like the renewable energy sector. “We’re retaking control of our energy security and our energy future,” Ali Zaidi, Mr. Biden’s climate adviser, said in an interview with The Times’s editorial board. At the same time, America should continue to pursue deeper economic ties with allied nations, as in a recent agreement to allow electric vehicle batteries made with minerals from Japan to qualify for U.S. tax credits.

American engagement with China is complicated by China’s contradictions. The country remains eager for access to advanced technologies and global markets, but resists giving reciprocal access to its own markets. In recent months, even as China has ended pandemic restrictions and made a show of reopening its doors, it has made life difficult for foreign firms, with raids on corporate offices, for instance. Some measures, like the refusal of Chinese antitrust authorities to let the American chip maker Intel buy the Israeli chip maker Tower, appear to be responses to U.S. restrictions. But longstanding grievances remain unresolved. It has been 22 years since China promised to let Visa and Mastercard operate on equal terms, and 11 years since the W.T.O. ruled that China wasn’t keeping that promise, yet the companies still are struggling for access.

The best reason for optimism is that the two nations still depend on each other. China’s recent struggles — slowing growth, an imploding housing sector, high youth unemployment and capital flight — appear to be motivating a more open stance among Chinese policymakers. And after a period of escalating tensions, the Biden administration also has sought to calm the waters by sending a series of senior officials to the country. In recent years, Chinese airlines have largely refrained from placing new orders for Boeing airplanes, making a political point of buying jets from Airbus, its European rival. But Guillaume Faury, the Airbus chief executive, predicted in a recent interview that the trend would not continue. “I don’t believe that China can rely on one aircraft manufacturer,” he said. “They need competition.” The first narrow-body jets produced by a Chinese company, Comac, entered commercial service earlier this year. The engines were manufactured in Durham, N.C.

The steadily rising trade between the United States and China from 1979 to the present has disrupted the lives of many Americans and caused real harm to some. That said, in the sweep of history those four decades were an era of remarkable peace between, and prosperity for, the two countries.

Some U.S. politicians want to take advantage of China’s dependence to constrain its economic development by denying China the technologies that it needs. The better course is to focus on limiting the reach of China’s military, not its economy as a whole. China sees that it cannot isolate itself from the world; this is not the time for the United States to do so, either.

Editorial Board THE DANGER OF PULLING TOO FAR BACK FROM CHINA New York Times (Sept. 24, 2023)

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