Discussions of the Trump and Biden administrations tariff and trade policies have continued to escalate during the closing days of this election season. Here are some additional points currently cited. Biden favored working with allies, however, he refused to join the revised Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Known as the Comprehensive & Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership or the CPTPP). President Trump nixed the initial TPP agreement. Biden’s newer approach to greater enforcement of antitrust laws dovetails with his trade policies, focusing on concentration of economic power both domestically and globally (as opposed to focusing on prices).

     There is growing concern that in a second term Trump would attempt to broaden his discretionary trade authority, first granted to presidents concerning trade in the 1930’s under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. He might also use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose sanctions for a broad range of foreign activities.

     In addition, there is concern that he would also broaden his previous efforts of renegotiating existing trade agreements (which he did concerning Mexico, Korea and Japan) and of course impose huge new tariffs on China and others (for example, Mexico) — under various authorities including balance of payments legislation, antidumping / subsidies statutes, retaliation for unfair / illegal trade practices and threats to national security.

      To me, it is clear that no matter who wins this presidential election, U.S. trade policy will continue to be recalibrated in this new era of national security concerns, huge changes in geopolitics and rebuilding sectors of the national economy to provide greater employment and supply-chain security.

The next question is whether Mr. Trump has the power to impose a universal tariff. The Constitution grants Congress, not the President, authority over trade. It’s unlikely that Congress would pass a new broad-based tariff on all imports, though protectionism has been gaining support in the Trump era. But Congress has already ceded considerable power to the President, especially provisions against “unfair” trade practices (Section 301) and “national security” threats (Section 232). Mr. Trump used these powers in his first term, and he was aggressive in exploiting 232 in particular, as he no doubt would be again. The next question is whether Mr. Trump has the power to impose a universal tariff. The Constitution grants Congress, not the President, authority over trade. It’s unlikely that Congress would pass a new broad-based tariff on all imports, though protectionism has been gaining support in the Trump era. But Congress has already ceded considerable power to the President, especially provisions against “unfair” trade practices (Section 301) and “national security” threats (Section 232). Mr. Trump used these powers in his first term, and he was aggressive in exploiting 232 in particular, as he no doubt would be again. Yet it’s hard to believe Mr. Trump could legally get away with declaring all imports from everywhere an emergency to impose a tariff. That would transform IEEPA from a sanctions law into a grant of limitless presidential power over trade. …. Known as import substitution, this model of economic growth kept India globally uncompetitive for decades. It would guarantee higher consumer prices and the slow erosion of U.S. business competitiveness. “Trump’s Tariffs and Risks.” Wall Street Journal (10.22.24).

Biden may be a one-term president, but his administration has changed the global political economy in ways that will continue to resonate long after he is gone. In particular, his trade policy put an end to the era of laissez-faire globalisation …. The Biden administration’s theories around antitrust and competition policy, dovetails with its trade policy. The problem in the global economy today isn’t tariff barriers — it’s concentrated power, be it in states (like China) or companies …. This is an approach that puts power, not just price, at the center of market-making trade today. “Power as well as Price Matters for an Economy.” Financial Times (Oct. 20, 2024).

Roosevelt signed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, under which Congress gave the president authority to negotiate tariff deals with other countries — cutting U.S. tariffs in return for lower tariffs on U.S. exports. This American system then became the template for a global trading system …. The idea behind presidential discretion on tariffs was that presidents, with a broader view of the national interest than members of Congress, would use their power sparingly. Nobody seems to have considered the implications of a president more protectionist than Congress …. “Trump’s Radical Tariff Policy.” New York Times (Oct. 20. 2024).

Trump ended up using tariffs to renegotiate deals with trading partners. The North American Free Trade Agreement became USMCA, South Korea agreed to amend the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and Japan lowered barriers to U.S. agricultural products …. He could instead turn to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a 1977 law intended to sanction countries and individuals seen as national security threats such as Iran and Venezuela. “Second Trump Presidency Stands to Radically Me World Trade.” Wall Street Journal (Oct. 17, 2024).